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  STATE IMPERILED SPECIES LEGISLATION 
BY 
ROBERT L. FISCHMAN,* VICKY J. MERETSKY,** WILLEM DREWS,*** KATLIN 
STEPHANI**** & JENNIFER TESON***** 
State wildlife conservation programs are essential to 
accomplishing the national goal of extinction prevention. By virtue of 
their constitutional powers, their expertise, and their on-the-ground 
personnel, states could—in theory—accomplish far more than the 
federal agencies directly responsible for implementing the Endangered 
Species Act (ESA). States plausibly argue that they can catalyze 
collaborative conservation that brings together key stakeholders to 
improve conditions for imperiled species. Bills to revise the ESA seek 
to delegate greater authority to states. We evaluated states’ imperiled 
species legislation to determine their legal capacity to employ the key 
regulatory tools that prompt collaborative conservation. All but four 
states possess statutory programs to identify species on the brink of 
extinction. Most of them include both animals protected under the ESA 
and wildlife imperiled just within the boundaries of the state. Thirty-
four states legislate imperiled plant protection programs. States 
generally fail to prohibit habitat impairment by private parties, lack 
permit programs to minimize incidental harms to species and spur 
habitat conservation, and do not restrict state agency actions that 
undermine species recovery. Compared to the key regulatory programs 
of the ESA that prompt stakeholders to collaborate on conservation, 
state laws—in general—reflect a more permissive attitude. Though 
state laws, in the aggregate, only weakly support cooperative 
federalism, some state legislative provisions are very strong. Illinois, 
Massachusetts, and Wisconsin even go beyond the ESA in their 
protective measures. Major funding increases to pay for conservation 
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measures could overcome weak agency regulatory authority, but 
prospects for a spending spree are dim. Therefore, some state 
legislative reform will be necessary to implement stronger cooperative 
federalism under the ESA. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Endangered Species Act1 (ESA) may well be the most contentious 
of the federal environmental statutes. It certainly is the most controversial 
of the conservation laws outside the purview of the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Yet, in congressional hearing after 
congressional hearing, one consensus rises above the rancor. All parties 
agree that states should play a greater role in preventing extinctions.2 
Immense conservation benefits would accrue from more active state 
programs designed to arrest the decline of rare species or to recover 
endangered species. Alas, potential benefits are seldom realized because 
neither state treasuries nor the federal appropriations provide sufficient 
resources for conservation actions. But, suppose Congress decided to 
transfer the federal endangered species budget to states through block 
 
 1  Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012). 
 2  E.g., Oversight: Modernization of the Endangered Species Act: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Env’t & Pub. Works, 115th Cong. 161 (2017) (statement of Jamie Rappaport Clark, 
President and CEO, Defenders of Wildlife); id. at 161–62 (testimony of Dan M. Ashe, President 
and CEO, Association of Zoos and Aquariums); W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N, POLICY RESOLUTION 2016-
08: SPECIES CONSERVATION AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 1–2 (2016), 
https://perma.cc/6XMR-NKBK [hereinafter WGA POLICY RESOLUTION] (recommending statutory 
reforms for greater state involvement); see also H.R. 4315, 113th Cong. § 3(a)(2) (2014) (passed 
by the U.S. House of Representatives on July 29, 2014) (requiring a greater role for states in ESA 
listing decisions); S. 1731, 113th Cong. § 4 (2013) (requiring state consent for listing decisions 
and allowing states to assert exclusive authority to manage intra-state listed species and 
highlighting the role of states in listing decisions and in conservation partnerships); The 
Endangered Species Act: Reviewing the Nexus of Science and Policy: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the H. Comm. on Science, Space, and Technology, 
112th Cong. 3 (2011), https://perma.cc/NA82-5G3K (testimony of Gary Frazer, Assistant 
Director, Endangered Species, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service). 
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grants.3 Would that prove more effective than the current approach? Putting 
aside the political and implementation uncertainties over how effectively 
states would spend new monies, this Article shows that there is another 
hurdle to greater delegation of responsibility to prevent extinction: weak 
state legislation. 
We reviewed legislation relevant to recovery of imperiled species for all 
fifty states. Most states adopt the argot of the ESA, which refers to species 
on the brink of extinction as “endangered” and those with a somewhat lower 
risk of disappearing as “threatened.” But other states define the words 
differently or employ alternative terminology. Therefore, we use the term 
“imperiled” to refer generally to species identified as needing special 
protections to avoid extinction. The ESA defines “conservation” to mean the 
use of methods “necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened 
species to the point at which the measures provided [by the Act] are no 
longer necessary.”4 In this sense, conservation is synonymous with recovery. 
Conservation and recovery are modest goals intended to move the very most 
imperiled species out of the legislative, emergency-room treatments of the 
ESA. They do not imply that a species has regained most of its habitat or 
historic abundance. When the term “conservation” is used in other contexts, 
it has a broader meaning that generally promises more abundant and healthy 
wildlife.5 
Part II of this Article constructs the cooperative federalism framework 
for understanding current debates about ESA reform. The ESA authorizes 
cooperative agreements, which serve as a conduit for federal grants to help 
states conduct conservation actions that aid federal efforts to recover 
species. Other environmental law programs present a more varied toolbox 
of state incentives that offer options for better promoting effective 
cooperation to prevent extinctions. Part III describes the three regulatory 
pillars of the ESA that account for the most species protections: interagency 
coordination, prohibitions, and permits. Part IV details our method of coding 
legislation to compare state imperiled species law with the ESA. 
Part V presents our results. We found legislative programs designed to 
recover imperiled animals in all but four states. Two states protect only 
species on the ESA list, and thirty-nine states automatically include ESA-
listed species among their longer imperiled species lists. Thirty-four states 
legislate imperiled plant protection programs. Of the twenty-four states that 
require periodic administrative updates to the status of listed species, 
twenty require status reviews every five years or more frequently. Only three 
state laws require preparation of species-specific recovery plans. Eleven 
state legislative codes require interagency cooperation to ensure that state 
agencies do not take actions to jeopardize state-listed species. Most state 
 
 3  E.g., WGA POLICY RESOLUTION, supra note 2, at 7 (calling for ESA block grant funding 
allowing states to spend the money according to their own priorities). 
 4  16 U.S.C. § 1532(3). 
 5  See, e.g., National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act of 1996, 16 U.S.C. 
§ 668ee(4) (defining “conservation” to mean “to sustain and, where appropriate, restore and 
enhance, healthy populations of . . . wildlife, and plants”). 
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wildlife legal regimes ban trafficking and purposeful actions to kill, capture, 
or injure an imperiled species. However, only two state statutes clearly 
prohibit habitat degradation that is incidental to some otherwise legal 
activity, such as farming.6 Nonetheless, seven state laws provide for 
incidental take permits, indicating a somewhat broader scope of 
prohibitions (as administered) than is apparent from the face of the statutes. 
Part VI discusses how our results relate to the current debates over 
ESA reauthorization. Compared to the key regulatory programs of the ESA 
that prompt stakeholders to collaborate on conservation, state laws, in 
general, reflect a more permissive attitude. Though state laws, in the 
aggregate, only weakly support cooperative federalism, some state 
legislative provisions are very strong. State programs in Illinois, 
Massachusetts, and Wisconsin even go beyond the ESA in their protective 
measures. They offer helpful models for other states seeking to improve the 
effectiveness of their imperiled species laws. However, we cannot speak to 
actual administration of the programs, in practice. We conclude with 
broader observations about how to make the ESA-reform debate more 
constructive and responsive to the consensus that state conservation 
programs are essential to preventing extinctions. 
II. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AND EXTINCTION PREVENTION 
Cooperative federalism has framed U.S. environmental law for the past 
half century.7 It is most closely associated with EPA, which relies on state 
personnel to permit and enforce programs that advance objectives under 
federal pollution-control statutes.8 But the natural resources side of 
environmental law also harnesses cooperative federalism.9 The ESA 
expressly addresses cooperative federalism in section 6, which requires the 
relevant cabinet officials to cooperate with states “to the maximum extent 
practicable.”10 This reflects a common, deferential formulation of savings 
clauses for state authority in federal natural resources statutes.11 Section 6 
authorizes cooperative agreements between federal agencies and states only 
to recover species already listed under the ESA.12 The ESA does not 
 
 6  A third state, New York, prohibits incidental take according to a judicial interpretation of 
more ambiguous language in its statute. See State v. Sour Mountain Realty, Inc., 714 N.Y.S.2d 
78, 80, 82–83 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (upholding an injunction against a mine that erected a fence 
that kept state-listed rattlesnakes from making their seasonal migration); see also infra notes 
251–252 and accompanying text. 
 7  Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 179, 187 (2005). 
 8  Id. at 188–89. 
 9  See generally id. at 193–204 (arguing that the state-federal system of managing natural 
resources can be understood as cooperative federalism). 
 10  16 U.S.C. § 1535(a). 
 11  Robert L. Fischman & Angela M. King, Savings Clauses and Trends in Natural Resources 
Federalism, 32 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 129, 161 (2007) (explaining that more courts 
are adopting interpretation approaches that encourage “federal reconsideration of state 
interests in public land management”). 
 12  16 U.S.C. § 1535(c)(1)–(2). 
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expressly authorize agreements with or grants to states to protect declining 
species in order to stave off federal listing. Instead, a separate federal grant 
program provides states with funding to undertake actions focused on 
preventing imperilment.13 States with federally approved state wildlife action 
plans (SWAPs) are eligible for this preventive funding.14 
States have complained for decades about implementation of the 
section 6 cooperative agreements program. Many states would interpret the 
self-contradicting text of section 6 to prohibit federal preemption of state 
programs weaker than federal law.15 Though there is support for that view in 
the legislative history,16 courts have rejected the antipreemption arguments.17 
The result is cooperative agreements that “demand very little from the states 
and offer the same in return.”18 Most of the agreements relate to listing, 
monitoring, and voluntary conservation programs.19 Congress has increased 
section 6 funding in the past quarter century, from 1% of the United States 
Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) budget in 1990 ($6.7 million),20 to 3% in 2000 
($26.9 million),21 and to 3.5% in 2017 ($53.5 million).22 That funding offers 
 
 13  Pittman-Robertson Wildlife Restoration Act, 16 U.S.C. § 669c(d) (describing the 
requirements for the state wildlife grants tied to state wildlife action plans (SWAPs), first 
authorized in Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-63, 115 Stat. 408 (2001)). 
 14  Id.; U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., FEDERAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE: PART 517 FINANCIAL 
ASSISTANCE—ELIGIBILITY & PROGRAM-SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS § 10 (2010), 
https://perma.cc/NR9C-3CRV (setting out the requirements for approving SWAPs). 
 15  Compare 16 U.S.C. § 1535(g)(2)(A) (stating that takings prohibitions set forth in 1533(d) 
for resident species do not apply to a state with a cooperative agreement), and id. § 1533(d) 
(stating that protective regulations apply only if the state has adopted those regulations), with 
id. § 1535(f) (emphasizing that a state law that interferes with the purpose of the ESA is void). 
 16  See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 93-740, at 9–10 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 979, 986–89; 
S. REP. NO. 93-307, at 8 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2989, 2996–97. For a 
comprehensive review of the legislative history of ESA section 6, see generally Robert P. 
Davison, The Evolution of Federalism Under Section 6 of the Endangered Species Act, in THE 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND FEDERALISM: EFFECTIVE CONSERVATION THROUGH GREATER STATE 
COMMITMENT 89 (Kaush Arha & Barton H. Thompson, Jr. eds., 2011). 
 17  E.g., Swan View Coal., Inc. v. Turner, 824 F. Supp. 923, 938 (D. Mont. 1992) (holding that 
“the less restrictive takings provisions under Montana law are preempted by the ESA”); United 
States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. 1126, 1134 (E.D. Cal. 1992) (holding that “to 
the extent that California’s law on taking is less protective than the Endangered Species Act, it 
is preempted”); see also Robert L. Fischman & Jaelith Hall-Rivera, A Lesson for Conservation 
from Pollution Control Law: Cooperative Federalism for Recovery Under the Endangered 
Species Act, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 45, 81 (2002) (summarizing the operation of ESA section 6 in 
the context of cooperative federalism); John Copeland Nagle, The Original Role of the States in 
the Endangered Species Act, 53 IDAHO L. REV. 385, 414–18 (2017) (providing an insightful review 
of the legislative history of section 6 and Swan View Coalition).  
 18  J.B. Ruhl, Cooperative Federalism and the Endangered Species Act: A Comparative 
Assessment and Call for Change, in THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND FEDERALISM, supra note 
16, at 35, 35. 
 19  Id. at 41. 
 20  Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1991, Pub. L. No. 
101-512, 104 Stat. 1915, 1918 (1990). 
 21  Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 
106-291, 114 Stat. 922, 927 (2000). 
 22  Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-31, 131 Stat. 135, 139–40.  
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ample incentive to induce most states to enter into agreements.23 A state 
receiving cooperative funds must surmount the low bar of showing that it 
has enacted authority to conserve resident species, has established 
acceptable conservation programs, possesses authority to conduct 
investigations to determine the status of animal species, and provides for 
public participation in designating species as imperiled.24 It must also match 
a portion of the costs of projects funded.25 State spending constitutes about 
5% of total ESA appropriations.26 
Appropriations still fall far short of the estimated costs of preventing 
extinction, however. The total costs of recovering the 1,661 ESA-listed 
species in the United States is unknown.27 But one can derive recovery costs 
for those 1,159 species with recovery plans. The plans identify costs of $1.21 
billion/year.28 Currently, FWS tallies spending of federal and state 
governments together for endangered species protection between one and 
two billion dollars annually.29 However, that includes funding all aspects of 
the program, including listing, which is not directly tied to recovering 
already listed species.30 Nearly all of that money goes to staff salaries and 
operations, not directly to recovery efforts.31 A peer-reviewed study of the 
budget indicated that Congress funds less than 25% of the aggregate annual 
recovery plan costs.32 The budget outlook for the foreseeable future remains 
austere. 
Since 1994, the United States Department of the Interior’s FWS and the 
Department of Commerce’s National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) 
(collectively, the Services) policy on section 6 cooperation has emphasized 
the states’ role in preventing listing by alleviating threats to declining 
 
 23  Grants: Overview, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., https://perma.cc/79TL-J7P3 (last updated 
Jan. 4, 2017) (noting that most states have entered into cooperative agreements). J.B. Ruhl 
states that all states have entered into cooperative agreements, which our findings show would 
result in grants to states that have only the weakest basis for meeting the ESA criteria. Ruhl, 
supra note 18, at 41. 
 24  ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1535(c) (2012). 
 25  Grants: Overview, supra note 23 (states must match 25% of most project costs unless 
they are implementing a cooperative project with other states, in which case the match is 10%).  
 26  Alejandro E. Camacho et al., Assessing State Laws and Resources for Endangered 
Species Protection, 47 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,837, 10,838 (Oct. 1, 2017). 
 27  Listed Species Summary (Boxscore), U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., https://perma.cc/7JJC-
S686 (last updated Jan. 27, 2018). 
 28  Id.; see Leah R. Gerber, Conservation Triage or Injurious Neglect in Endangered Species 
Recovery, 113 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. U.S. 3563, 3563, 3565 (2016) (statistics based on 2016 
data with 1,125 listed species).  
 29  Endangered Species Act Document Library, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 
https://perma.cc/VCX3-EVVP (last updated Dec. 3, 2017) (listing annual Expenditure Reports 
from 1996–2015). The most recent report tallied $1.3 billion in ESA-conservation expenditures. 
U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., FEDERAL AND STATE ENDANGERED AND THREATENED SPECIES 
EXPENDITURES 78 (2014), https://perma.cc/NJB8-BZAY [hereinafter FWS EXPENDITURES].  
 30  FWS EXPENDITURES, supra note 29, at 4. 
 31  For the actual appropriations going to recovery plan tasks, see Gerber, supra note 28, 
app. 1–39.  
 32  Id. at 3563. 
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species.33 Pursuant to the policy, the Services enter into candidate 
conservation agreements with states and other stakeholders to apply 
conservation measures to a particular species, which are then considered in 
listing decisions.34 Most rare and declining species are not on the very brink 
of extinction.35 The SWAPs required for states to be eligible for federal 
nongame conservation grants have identified over 12,000 species of greatest 
conservation need (SGCN), which are generally declining in range or 
population.36 The SGCNs include ESA-listed species as well as rare and 
declining species that might be eligible for listing if the state fails to 
conserve them.37 Each state’s wildlife action plan contains conservation 
actions to sustain and restore SGCN populations. Unfortunately, 
implementation has been hampered by inadequate funding.38 A recent study 
estimates that implementation of the state action plans would require $1.3 
billion annually, which would be a bargain if it fulfilled its promise of 
stemming the tide of new ESA listings.39 Most state officials and 
conservationists agree that increasing funding for conservation of SGCNs 
would alleviate many ESA controversies because fewer species would 
decline to the point of listing.40 
Virtually no player in U.S. politics wins points by praising federal 
bureaucrats. Members of Congress, like fellow politicians, are fond of 
promoting better management by transferring authorities from “distant 
bureaucrats” in Washington to state officials, who are regarded as “closest” 
to the conservation needs of species.41 Tilting the balance of cooperative 
federalism more toward states has many benefits. For instance, state fish 
 
 33  Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants: Notice of Interagency Cooperative 
Policy Regarding the Role of State Agencies in Endangered Species Act Activities, 59 Fed. Reg. 
34,274, 34,275 (July 1, 1994). Recently, the Services revised the policy. See Revised Interagency 
Cooperative Policy Regarding the Role of State Agencies in Endangered Species Act Activities, 
81 Fed. Reg. 8663, 8664 (Feb. 22, 2016) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. ch. IV). 
 34  E.g., U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. ET AL., CANDIDATE CONSERVATION AGREEMENT FOR THE 
LOUISIANA PINE SNAKE 3 (2013), https://perma.cc/9N93-94PH (addressing conservation needs of 
a rare snake through cooperation among FWS, federal land managers, state agencies, and other 
parties). 
 35 H.R 1314, H.R. 1927, H.R. 4256, H.R. 4284, H.R. 4319, and H.R. 4866: Legislative Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on Nat. Res., 113th Cong. 17 (2014) [hereinafter Hearings] (prepared 
statement of Robert L. Fischman, Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law); 
see also Vicky J. Meretsky et al., A State-Based National Network for Effective Wildlife 
Conservation, 62 BIOSCIENCE 970, 970, 974–75 (2012) (describing the importance of state 
programs that identify declining species before they get to the point of imperilment). 
 36  ASS’N OF FISH & WILDLIFE AGENCIES, THE FUTURE OF AMERICA’S FISH AND WILDLIFE: A 21ST 
CENTURY VISION FOR INVESTING IN AND CONNECTING PEOPLE TO NATURE 6 (2016), 
https://perma.cc/G7T3-3U32. 
 37  Id.  
 38  Id. 
 39  Id. at 7. 
 40  E.g., Hearings, supra note 35, at 17–19 (prepared statement of Robert L. Fischman, 
Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law).  
 41  E.g., Press Release, House Comm. on Nat. Res., Committee to Hold Endangered Species 
Act Hearing (May 28, 2013), https://perma.cc/F6FW-A7HD (addressing positive and cooperative 
species conservation efforts).  
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and wildlife agencies employ 50,000 staff on the front lines of conservation 
challenges.42 But, their funding is paltry compared to their current needs. 
Shouldering greater responsibility for imperiled species recovery is not 
realistic without a significant increase in funding. In 2016, the Association of 
Fish & Wildlife Agencies launched a major initiative to address the funding 
problems through federal appropriations from royalties, fees, and bonus 
bids collected by federal energy resource agencies.43 The Land and Water 
Conservation Fund, which assists federal agencies and states/local 
jurisdictions with property acquisition, pulls from similar sources of federal 
revenue.44 Its fate in budget negotiations will serve as a harbinger of the 
success of the state wildlife funding initiative. 
But, even taking the most optimistic scenario for greater state funding, 
it will be hard to improve the success rate for species recovery without the 
legal tools that prompt stakeholders to collaborate on conservation projects. 
Under the ESA, federal agencies can threaten enforcement of draconian 
bans on harming species through habitat modifications, or halting desired 
federal programs and permits.45 Federal agencies seldom carry through on 
those dreaded outcomes.46 But the specter of enforcement, though unlikely, 
does motivate collaborative conservation by landowners, their lenders, and 
others whose businesses create habitat degradation or otherwise impede 
recovery. Decades of research by Steven Yaffee and Julia Wondolleck found 
that conservation collaboration successes depend on “legal structures that 
establish management bottom lines” for conservation goals.47 The ESA, in 
particular, served as the “regulatory driver” of stakeholder cooperation in 
about half of the hundreds of conservation collaborations they studied.48 The 
legal mandates create incentives to collaborate on projects that avoid more 
drastic outcomes (e.g., ESA section 7 jeopardy)49 and to establish clear 
 
 42  Oversight: Modernization of the Endangered Species Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on Env’t & Pub. Works, 115th Cong. 50 (2017) (statement of Gordon S. Myers, Executive 
Director, North Carolina Wildlife Resources Commission, and President, Southeastern 
Association of Fish and Wildlife Agencies). As early as the enactment of the 1973 ESA, Congress 
noted that the most efficient way to recover species was to tap into state wildlife agencies. S. 
REP. NO. 93-307, at 1 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 298, 303. 
 43  ASS’N OF FISH & WILDLIFE AGENCIES, supra note 36, at 10. 
 44  Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965, 54 U.S.C. §§ 200301–200310 (Supp. II 
2015) (describing sources of funding for land and water conservation). 
 45  See Jacob W. Malcom & Ya-Wei Li, Data Contradict Common Perceptions About a 
Controversial Provision of the U.S. Endangered Species Act, 112 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. U.S. 
15,844, 15,844–45 (2015). 
 46  See id. at 15,845 (finding only 0.0023% of all 6,829 formal consultations between 2008 and 
April 2015 resulted in jeopardy decisions); see also MICHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE J. ROWLAND, THE 
EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 234 (3d ed. 1997) (noting that the federal government 
rarely prosecutes incidental takes). 
 47  Steven L. Yaffee, Collaborative Strategies for Managing Animal Migrations: Insights from 
the History of Ecosystem-Based Management, 41 ENVTL. L. 655, 677 (2011). 
 48  Id.; see STEVEN L. YAFFEE ET AL., ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: AN 
ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT EXPERIENCE 21, 27 (1996); see also JULIA M. WONDOLLECK & STEVEN L. 
YAFFEE, MAKING COLLABORATION WORK: LESSONS FROM INNOVATION IN NATURAL RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT 102, 240 (2000) (describing more case studies). 
 49  See infra notes 61–64 and accompanying text. 
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accountability through scientifically sound goalposts for tracking success.50 
The ESA statutory threshold of jeopardy has been credited with signaling 
when key ecological thresholds of disruption may be crossed and prompting 
collaborative approaches to water governance.51 If legislation or 
administration were to push more species recovery responsibility toward 
states, could the states mount similar incentives for private actors to 
collaborate? 
Our research attempts to answer that question by evaluating the 
legislative authorities defining the duties and powers of state agencies 
responsible for wildlife management. In brief, we find most states possess 
insufficient statutory authority. Nonetheless, some state laws offer good 
models to strengthen other states’ ability to prevent extinctions. Before 
presenting the results of our analysis, we review how the ESA establishes 
incentives for conservation. The next Part surveys the key ESA provisions 
against which we measure state laws in Parts IV and V. 
III. THE THREE REGULATORY PILLARS OF THE ESA 
In order to be protected under the ESA, species must be listed and 
critical habitats designated under a notice-and-comment, informal 
rulemaking procedure.52 No unlisted species or undesignated habitats 
receive any protection under the ESA, no matter how biologically imperiled 
they may be.53 The Services share responsibility for these programs and are 
often called the “listing agencies.”54 Species are listed as endangered55 or 
threatened,56 depending on the imminence of extinction risk.57 The Services’ 
cooperative federalism policy promises that they will “utilize the expertise” 
of and “solicit” information from state wildlife agencies on listing and other 
regulatory rulemaking.58 In addition to enforcing the regulatory programs 
 
 50  Yaffee, supra note 47, at 677–78. 
 51  Bruce C. Chaffin et al., Resilience, Adaptation, and Transformation in the Klamath River 
Basin Social-Ecological System, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 157, 191 (2014); Barbara Cosens et al., The 
Adaptive Water Governance Project: Assessing Law, Resilience and Governance in Regional 
Socio-Ecological Water Systems Facing a Changing Climate, 51 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 27 (2014). 
 52  ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (2012). 
 53  See DEFS. OF WILDLIFE, PROTECTING UNLISTED SPECIES: ASSESSING AND IMPROVING 
CANDIDATE CONSERVATION AGREEMENTS WITH ASSURANCES 3 (2013), https://perma.cc/KY6D-
RKKR. 
 54  NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., UPDATED STATUS OF FEDERALLY LISTED ESUS OF WEST 
COAST SALMON AND STEELHEAD 8 (Thomas P. Good et al. eds., 2005).  
 55  Endangered species are those “in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant 
portion of [their] range.” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6). 
 56  Threatened species are those “likely to become an endangered species within the 
foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of [their] range.” Id. § 1532(20). 
 57  See In re Polar Bear Endangered Species Act Listing and § 4(D) Rule Litigation, 748 F. 
Supp. 2d 19, 26 (D.D.C. 2010) (acknowledging “a temporal element to the distinction between 
the categories of endangered and threatened species” based on the plain language of the 
statute). 
 58  Revised Interagency Cooperative Policy Regarding the Role of State Agencies in 
Endangered Species Act Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 8663, 8663 (Feb. 22, 2016) (to be codified at 50 
C.F.R. ch. IV). 
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that apply after listing, the Services have a duty to prepare a recovery plan 
for each listed species.59 However, compliance with the plans is not 
mandatory,60 so we exclude them from our description of regulatory 
elements of the ESA. Recovery plans are important to provide clear 
objectives for collaborative conservation. But they do not require 
stakeholders to act. 
Once listed, three key regulatory programs work to protect species. The 
first program involves federal agency action that triggers interagency, 
interdisciplinary analysis. Under section 7 of the ESA, an action agency (one 
authorizing, funding, or carrying out an action) that may affect a listed 
species must consult with the listing Service.61 This consultation involves the 
same kind of look-before-you-leap evaluation as the Fish and Wildlife 
Coordination Act62 and the National Environmental Policy Act63 (NEPA).64 
The main difference between the ESA consultation process and those other 
statutory programs is that the procedural elements are supplemented by a 
substantive threshold banning certain actions due to adverse impacts.65 
Section 7 prohibits actions that the analysis shows are “likely to jeopardize 
the continued existence of” a listed species or “result in the destruction or 
adverse modification of” critical habitat.66 This motivates the action agency 
(and the permittee if the impacts are from a proposed authorization of 
private activity, such as filling a wetland) to mitigate impacts so that they 
fall short of the jeopardy threshold. 
Because state law generally cannot constrain federal agencies, there are 
relatively few ways for states to take on more responsibility for section 7 
consultation. Under NEPA, state agencies may receive cooperating agency 
status, which allows them to exert influence over the impact analysis 
without having to wait for formal comment periods.67 It is possible that a 
revision of the section 7 consultation regulations could facilitate similar 
state involvement on the inside of consultation, which typically has few 
windows for public notice and comment.68 The current cooperative 
federalism policy of the Services promises to inform state agencies of 
federal agency actions subject to consultation, to request relevant 
 
 59  16 U.S.C. § 1533(f). As of November 26, 2017, 1159 of the 1661 listed species in the United 
States have approved recovery plans. Listed Species Summary (Boxscore), supra note 27. 
 60  Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Park Serv., 669 F. Supp. 384, 388–89 (D. Wyo. 1987) 
(“Congressional intent supports the view that the Secretary is required to develop a recovery 
plan only insofar as he reasonably believes that it would promote conservation.”). 
 61  16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). 
 62  Id. §§ 661–666c. 
 63  National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4333 (2012). 
 64  Id. § 4321 (providing that one of NEPA’s purposes is “to promote efforts which will 
prevent or eliminate damage to the environment”). 
 65  16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). 
 66  Id. 
 67  See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.6, 1505.3 (2016). 
 68  See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 660 n.6 (2007) (noting 
that the public does not have a right under the ESA to comment on interagency consultations 
(citing Interagency Cooperation—Endangered Species Act of 1973, as Amended; Final Rule, 51 
Fed. Reg. 19,926, 19,928 (June 3, 1986) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 402))). 
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information from the relevant states, and to request an update of 
information prior to concluding consultation.69 State wildlife agencies often 
have deep expertise on listed species within their jurisdictions, which may 
be reason enough to include states in consultation in a more formal way. 
The Services recognized this expertise in their 2016 policy revisions to 
promote greater state involvement in formal consultation under section 7.70 
Some states develop relevant experience in evaluating agency impacts 
through state laws that limit their own actions along procedural or 
substantive lines similar to the ESA.71 But wholesale devolution of federal 
consultation is not feasible. 
The second key element of the ESA involves the broad, section 9 
prohibitions against activities that “take” individuals of a listed animal 
species.72 Take is but one of several section 9 prohibitions, most of which 
address trafficking.73 But it is the broadest, most controversial, and most 
responsive to the chief cause of species imperilment: habitat alteration.74 
Congress defined “take” to include “harm,”75 which the Services interpret as: 
“an act which actually kills or injures wildlife. Such act may include 
significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or 
injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, 
including breeding, feeding, or sheltering.”76 The take prohibition is the 
element that states could potentially play a much larger role in 
implementing. Unlike section 7, which is applicable only to federal agencies, 
the section 9 prohibitions apply to all persons.77 State police power to 
provide for public health and welfare, and to fulfill wildlife trust 
responsibilities,78 is a better match for limiting private activities to conserve 
 
 69  Revised Interagency Cooperative Policy Regarding the Role of State Agencies in 
Endangered Species Act Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 8663, 8664 (Feb. 22, 2016) (to be codified at 50 
C.F.R. ch. IV). 
 70  See id. at 8663–65.  
 71  See id. at 8664. 
 72  ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (2012). 
 73  Id. § 1538(a), (d), (f). 
 74  David S. Wilcove et al., Quantifying Threats to Imperiled Species in the United States, 48 
BIOSCIENCE 607, 607–08 & tbl.1 (1998) (finding habitat degradation is a threat to 85% of 
imperiled species); see REED F. NOSS ET AL., THE SCIENCE OF CONSERVATION PLANNING: HABITAT 
CONSERVATION UNDER THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 2 (1997); see also NAT’L RES. COUNCIL ET 
AL., SCIENCE AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 7, 35–38, 40, 94 (1995). 
 75  16 U.S.C. § 1532(19). 
 76  50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2016); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or. (Sweet 
Home), 515 U.S. 687, 691 (1995) (upholding this regulatory definition). 
 77  16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B). The ESA defines “person” to mean “an individual, corporation, 
partnership, trust, association, or any other private entity; or any officer, employee, agent, 
department, or instrumentality of the Federal Government, of any State, municipality, or 
political subdivision of a State, or of any foreign government; any State, municipality, or 
political subdivision of a State; or any other entity subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States.” Id. § 1532(13). 
 78  Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 545 (1976) (discussing the states’ “broad trustee and 
police powers over wild animals within their jurisdictions”); see also Michael C. Blumm & 
Aurora Paulsen, The Public Trust in Wildlife, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 1437, 1442, 1477 (explaining that 
all states except Nevada and Utah have asserted a fiduciary duty and power to conserve 
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species than federal power under the commerce clause of the U.S. 
Constitution. The federal government and its enforcement offices generally 
lack the land-use control authorities that most states delegate to local 
governments. Local governments, operating under state enabling statutes, 
have much greater leverage than the Services to monitor, minimize, and 
mitigate habitat loss for imperiled species.79 States are the logical 
implementing agents for the vast majority of conservation challenges where 
habitat degradation or loss is the leading threat to the continued existence 
of a species.80 On the other hand, even with more money, states and local 
governments may lack the political will and expertise to prevent habitat 
degradation. 
For threatened species only, the ESA provides flexibility for the listing 
agencies to loosen some of the prohibitions that are statutorily applied to 
endangered species. The Services may promulgate ESA section “4(d) rules” 
exercising this authority, which allows for relief from the ban on incidental 
take81 through habitat alteration.82 The Services sometimes use this 
administrative flexibility to induce state cooperation in recovery efforts in 
exchange for special exceptions to otherwise applicable prohibitions.83 
Prohibitions are common in federal environmental law and often serve 
as gateways to permit programs. For instance, the Clean Water Act84 (CWA) 
prohibits “the discharge of any pollutant by any person.”85 However, the 
proscription primarily functions as a trigger for dischargers to seek permits 
that limit harm rather than as an outright ban of the discharges. Though not 
originally the purpose of the ESA section 9 prohibitions, after 1982 they 
often function to channel habitat-modifying activities into permit programs.86  
The most important such program is the third key ESA regulatory 
element: incidental take permits. Section 10 of the ESA allows otherwise 
prohibited takes where they are incidental to, rather than the purpose of, the 
 
wildlife). Most states also assert some form of ownership over wild animals. See, e.g., IND. CODE 
§ 14-22-1-1(a) (2017). 
 79  See WGA POLICY RESOLUTION, supra note 2, at 1–4. 
 80  See id. at 1–2 (calling for an ESA amendment that provides incentives to state and local 
governments to craft “land-use and development plans that meet the objectives of the ESA as 
well as local needs”); see also Douglas P. Wheeler, It Ain’t Broke but It Should Be Fixed, ENVTL. 
F., May/June 2016, at 57, 57 (proposing that the Services “delegate responsibility for 
administration of the ESA to states, like California, which have robust programs of their own”). 
 81  An incidental take results from a side-effect of an otherwise legal activity (e.g., farming) 
rather than from the purpose of the activity (e.g., hunting). 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2016).  
 82  16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (allowing regulations “necessary and advisable to provide for the 
conservation of [threatened] species”). 
 83  See Fischman & Hall-Rivera, supra note 17, at 133–34 (analyzing the track record and 
potential of ESA 4(d) rules to promote conservation through cooperative federalism); see also 
infra notes 91–103 and accompanying text (describing examples of the use of cooperative 
federalism 4(d) rules). 
 84  Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012). 
 85  Id. § 1311(a). 
 86  See generally Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, § 6, 96 
Stat. 1411, 1422–24 (providing amendments to the ESA that allow permits for takings and 
habitat modifications). 
7_TOJCI.FISCHMAN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/3/2018 10:00 AM 
2018] STATE IMPERILED SPECIES LEGISLATION 93 
activity.87 By providing flexibility for otherwise illegal incidental takes, the 
permit program paradoxically increased the Services’ leverage over habitat-
degrading activities “because it substituted a flexible regulatory authority for 
a threat of prosecution that few found credible.”88 For instance, when 
improved flood control on the Sacramento River facilitated development in 
the Natomas Basin of California, landowners and local jurisdictions secured 
an incidental take permit for development in order to degrade habitat of the 
giant garter snake and several other ESA-listed species.89 The permit 
included various commitments to minimize impacts, primarily through a 
statutorily required habitat conservation plan that established a conservancy 
to purchase, preserve, and manage mitigation habitat.90 However, unlike the 
permit programs under federal pollution-control statutes, the ESA fails to 
authorize states to take over implementation of the incidental take 
permitting process. 
One way to overcome this lack of delegation authority in the statute is 
through ESA 4(d) rules for threatened (but not endangered) species.91 A 
section 4(d) rule may allow incidental takes or otherwise prohibited harms if 
they occur pursuant to a particular plan or permit. For instance, FWS allows 
ranchers and farmers to take (either directly or incidentally) threatened 
Utah prairie dogs as long as they have permits from the Utah Division of 
Wildlife Resources.92 Rather than applying for federal section 10 permits 
after preparing habitat conservation plans, the agricultural land users merely 
apply to the state agency under a more permissive permitting regime.93 This 
saves the farmers and ranchers both the expense of developing a habitat 
conservation plan as well as the impact fees that typically fund mitigation 
 
 87  16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B). Section 10 also authorizes a number of other programs and 
exceptions (e.g., scientific permits, hardship exemptions, and experimental population 
designations), which are not as prominent as the incidental take permits. Id. § 1539(a)(1)(A), 
(b). 
 88  BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 46. 
 89  Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Babbitt, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1277–78, 1294, 1302 (E.D. Cal. 2000) 
(denying a 1997 permit for failure to adequately comply with several statutory conditions, 
including minimizing and mitigating the impacts of the takings, and ensuring adequate funding 
for the mitigation plan). The parties subsequently renegotiated the plan to the satisfaction of the 
court. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Norton, No. CIV-S-04-0579 DFL JF, 2005 WL 2175874, at *2 (E.D. 
Cal. Sept. 7, 2005) (upholding the revised 2003 incidental take permit). 
 90  Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 128 F. Supp. 2d at 1280. 
 91  16 U.S.C. § 1533(d); Fischman & Hall-Rivera, supra note 17, at 89; W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N, 
WGA SPECIES CONSERVATION AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT INITIATIVE YEAR TWO 
RECOMMENDATIONS 4, https://perma.cc/6C4A-ZZQC (last visited Jan. 27, 2018) [hereinafter WGA 
RECOMMENDATIONS] (promoting section 4(d) rules as vehicles for greater cooperative 
federalism).  
 92  50 C.F.R. § 17.40(g)(2)–(3) (2016); see also People for the Ethical Treatment of Prop. 
Owners v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 852 F.3d 990, 994 (10th Cir. 2017) (upholding the 
constitutionality of ESA regulation of Utah prairie dogs on private property). 
 93  50 C.F.R. § 17.40(g)(3); People for the Ethical Treatment of Prop. Owners, 852 F.3d at 
995, 997 (comparing the requirements for permitting through the Utah Division of Wildlife 
Resources (UDWR) with the base permit requirements from ESA for incidental takings, and 
concluding that the UDWR requirements are less stringent). 
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projects.94 One worry about the ESA 4(d) rule approach is that it will not 
generate sufficient funds for offsetting the adverse impacts from 
development.95 In the urban areas surrounding the Puget Sound, NMFS 
applies all the endangered prohibitions of ESA section 9 to the threatened 
Chinook salmon unless the takes occur pursuant to thirteen limitations 
approved by the listing agency.96 Some of the limitations relate to activities 
complying with particular programs named in the 4(d) rule, such as the 
Washington forest practices control program for fish conservation.97 This 
limitation rewards a state agency’s existing collaborative conservation 
efforts. Other limitations offer inducements for county and municipal 
jurisdictions to submit comprehensive land use plans for approval.98 If NMFS 
approves a plan, then all development proceeding under the plan is shielded 
from incidental take liability.99 This operates in much the same way as a 
large-scale, area-wide habitat conservation plan,100 such as the one approved 
in the Natomas Basin.101 But it does not require that all the incidental take 
permit criteria be met. The cooperative federalism for threatened animals 
invites states to strike deals with the Services that allow for state permitting 
and planning to substitute for incidental take permits.102 FWS has also 
experimented with relying on state rulemaking to issue incidental take 
permits, even for endangered species in some circumstances.103 
Of the three most powerful regulatory tools that influence habitat-
disturbing behavior, federal interagency cooperation under ESA section 7 
has the least potential for greater cooperative federalism. But it is a useful 
model for state laws seeking to reshape state agency decisions, such as 
industrial siting permits and highway construction. The section 9 
prohibitions against incidental take through habitat alteration could serve as 
federal floors upon which states could build their own imperiled species 
programs. Incidental take permitting is perfectly suited for state 
implementation and integration with planning and zoning. 
 
 94  E.g., Martin Wachs, It’s All About Finding the Money, ENVTL. F., May/June 2016, at 56, 56 
(citing the development fee structure of area-wide habitat conservation plans (HCPs) in 
California and Nevada). 
 95  Id. 
 96  50 C.F.R. § 223.203(b)(1)–(13). 
 97  Id. § 223.203(b)(13). 
 98  Id. § 223.203(b)(12). 
 99  Id. 
 100  Fischman & Hall-Rivera, supra note 17, at 146–50 (explaining how 4(d) rules can 
promote effective recovery by managing habitat over a large enough area to provide both a 
sufficient range for the species and economic development). In contrast to ESA section 4(d) 
tools that may be limited to land-use jurisdictions, anybody, including a small-lot owner, can 
apply for an incidental take permit. See Lynn Scarlett, Bigger May Sometimes Be Better, ENVTL. 
F., May/June 2016, at 54, 54 (noting that only 5% of HCPs apply to areas 100,000 acres or larger). 
 101  Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 128 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1279–82, 1302 (E.D. Cal. 2000). 
 102  See 50 C.F.R. § 222.103(a). 
 103  See, e.g., FLA. FISH & WILDLIFE CONSERVATION COMM’N & U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 
COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR FISH AND 
WILDLIFE SERVICE AND FLORIDA FISH AND WILDLIFE CONSERVATION COMMISSION FOR THE 
CONSERVATION OF ENDANGERED AND THREATENED FISH AND WILDLIFE 6 (2012), 
https://perma.cc/Z976-94K2 [hereinafter FLORIDA COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT]. 
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IV. METHOD AND CODING 
We reviewed all fifty state legislative codes as of March 15, 2017, to 
identify the key provisions that relate to extinction prevention. We did not 
review state constitutions, many of which address wildlife authority and 
place special powers directly in commissions.104 The scope of our research 
reaches to all types of species, including imperiled plants. However, we 
focused on programs that prevent animal species extinctions for two related 
reasons. First, states control wildlife directly through constitutional 
provisions and common law tradition.105 In many states, this control is 
articulated through the language of property: states assert ownership of 
wildlife.106 Plants, unlike animals, are considered part of the fee simple 
absolute estate.107 Therefore, landowners who hold complete title enjoy 
exclusive ownership of wild plants as they do crops, timber, and minerals. 
Wild animals on private land are not owned by the fee simple absolute estate 
holder unless they are captured or otherwise reduced to possession.108 State 
regulation of wildlife is much more extensive than regulation of plants 
because, in part, it interferes less directly with private property.109 
Second, federal law imposes almost no duties on private landowners to 
protect listed plants. As with animals, ESA-listed plants are subject to strict 
prohibitions on trade and commerce.110 But, incidental takes remain the most 
controversial limitations on private landowners.111 Unlike the incidental take 
prohibitions for listed animals, the section 9 duties for plants on private 
property limit only activities that “remove, cut, dig up, or damage” them “in 
knowing violation” of state law or in the course of a criminal trespass.112 
Thus, a farmer plowing under a listed plant or a builder excavating it would 
not face liability under the ESA unless some state law prohibits the activity. 
Our objective to determine whether state statutes would support equal 
levels of species recovery as the ESA does not require deep analysis of state 
plant conservation statutes, which already provide the only solid in situ 
 
 104  E.g., FLA. CONST. art. 4, § 9; ARK. CONST. amend. 35, § 1. 
 105  See Kleppe, 426 U.S. 529, 545 (1976).  
 106  Blumm & Paulsen, supra note 78, at 1462, 1488–1504. 
 107  See, e.g., Clarke v. Alstores Realty Corp., 527 P.2d 698, 701 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (“At 
common law, vegetation which grew from perennial roots without the aid of human care and 
cultivation . . . was considered as pertaining to realty.”); see also S. REP. NO. 100-240, at 12 
(1987) (“[L]andowners traditionally have been accorded greater rights with respect to plants 
growing on their lands than with respect to animals.”). 
 108  E.g., Swenson v. Holsten, 783 N.W.2d 580, 585 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010); see also Dale D. 
Goble, Three Cases/Four Tales: Commons, Capture, the Public Trust, and Property in Land, 35 
ENVTL. L. 807, 849–50 (2005) (summarizing the relationship between the common law property 
rights of landowners and control over wildlife). 
 109  Congress also justified the limited ESA section 9 prohibitions on listed plants based on 
the traditional rights of landowners. S. REP. NO. 100-240, at 12 (1987). 
 110  ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2) (2012). 
 111  See, e.g., RANDY T. SIMMONS, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 1 
(2002), https://perma.cc/SZQ8-UEAL. 
 112  16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2)(B). 
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protection for privately owned plants.113 The one exception is where private-
land activity requires a federal permit (e.g., filling a wetland). In that case, 
the ESA section 7 duty to avoid jeopardy to any species would trigger 
limitations in the service of plant conservation.114 
States may have a patchwork of statutes relevant to protecting 
imperiled animals, so we searched codes rather than session laws in order to 
evaluate the entire, currently applicable legislative program.115 Generally the 
scope of code titles and agencies dealing with “wildlife” or “fish and wildlife” 
extends to all animals.116 We used the Westlaw117 database but made minimal 
use of search terms. In general, state code contents are clearly outlined and 
the best method of finding the relevant legislation is to look at titles 
pertaining to “conservation,” “natural resources,” “fish & wildlife,” or 
“wildlife.” We often used the Westlaw search function to dive right into 
legislation dealing with “endangered species” and then looked at other 
chapter contents within the code title to ensure that we had identified all 
relevant legislation. A few state programs to prevent extinctions use terms 
other than “endangered.”118 For those states, we turned to the code’s table of 
contents to find the titles and chapters where relevant law would likely be 
codified. However, an overwhelming majority of states call the most 
imperiled category of species listed by their agencies “endangered.” 
Many state codes contain a variety of sections defining key terms. 
There may be a broadly applicable definitions section for the code itself and 
a more specific definitions section applicable to a title. In analyzing 
definitions, we always used the most specific definition we could find, 
starting with the section, and then moving up the hierarchy of the legislative 
code structure to subchapter, chapter, subtitle, title, etc. While the names of 
the levels of code organization vary, our search principle did not: we used 
the most narrowly applicable scope in coding definitions. This is consistent 
with the common canon of statutory construction that specific provisions 
trump general ones in legislation.119 
 
 113  See DEFS. OF WILDLIFE & CTR. FOR WILDLIFE LAW, STATE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACTS: PAST, 
PRESENT AND FUTURE 25–26 (1998) (discussing state conservation statutes that provide 
protection for privately owned plants).  
 114  16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). 
 115  Some state endangered species statutes contained programs that expired. For instance, 
the California Endangered Species Act originally required state agencies to consult on the 
effects of state action on state-listed species. See 1984 Cal. Stat. 4243, 4248; CAL. FISH & GAME 
CODE § 2096 (West 1998). Though extended through 1998, the legislature ultimately allowed the 
consultation program to expire. See 1993 Cal. Stat. 2107.  
 116  E.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1532(8) (“‘[F]ish or wildlife’ means any member of the animal 
kingdom . . . .”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 29, § 2-149.1 (2017) (providing that “wildlife” means all animals). 
 117  Westlaw Next is a registered trademark. WESTLAW NEXT, Registration No. 3,986,538. 
 118  E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 27-3-131 (2017) (defining “protected species” as “a species of 
animal life which the department shall have designated as a protected species and shall have 
made subject to the protection of this article”); see also id. § 27-3-132 (identifying species 
subject to special protections as “protected species” as a result of being “rare, unusual, or in 
danger of extinction”). 
 119  WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 275 (2000); 
see Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 1999). 
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Our method evaluated only legislation. Many states with very little 
legislation or few protections for species may nonetheless have extensive 
and effective state regulatory programs that emerge from particular agencies 
or administrations. Conversely, some states with seemingly strong statutory 
protections may fail to implement or enforce key provisions.120 Management 
plans, administrative rules, and cooperative agreements are all important 
aspects of state conservation programs.121 Yet, except for statutory mandates 
to prepare recovery plans for listed species, they fall largely outside the 
scope of our study. Moreover, California’s Natural Community Conservation 
Planning Act,122 though not an imperiled species law, goes further than any 
state in planning for conservation of ecosystems on which species depend.123 
As early as 1973, the disparity between legislation protecting imperiled 
species (then limited to less than twenty states)124 and administrative 
programs (established by thirty-five states)125 highlighted the limitations of a 
statutes-only review as a barometer of state commitment to extinction 
prevention.126 Nonetheless, legislation is important as enduring and binding 
instructions to state agencies. It is the strongest foundation upon which 
states can enhance their recovery programs. Legally, state legislation has 
served as the prime basis for delegating federal authority to state programs 
under pollution-control statutes.127 It would serve the same function should 
Congress heed the calls to amend the ESA to delegate greater regulatory 
authority to states. 
V. RESULTS 
All but four state legislative codes contain some program to protect in 
some way designated imperiled animals, by which we mean animal species 
that are on the verge of extinction within the state. Four states, Alabama, 
Arkansas, West Virginia, and Wyoming, have no general imperiled species 
legislation, though they have SWAPs that address SGCNs.128 Another state, 
 
 120  E.g., infra note 244 and accompanying text (noting Massachusetts has not designated any 
areas subject to a stringent program prohibiting alteration of significant habitat). 
 121  See Martha Williams, Lessons from the Wolf Wars: Recovery v. Delisting Under the 
Endangered Species Act, 27 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 106, 144 (2016). 
 122  CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 2800–2835 (West 2017). 
 123  See Fischman & Hall-Rivera, supra note 17, at 95–101 (describing how the Natural 
Community Conservation Planning program works). 
 124  Susan George & William J. Snape III, State Endangered Species Acts, in ENDANGERED 
SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES 344, 346 (Donald C. Baur & WM. Robert Irvin eds., 
2d ed. 2010) (providing that sixteen states possessed imperiled species legislation in 1973); 
Kaush Arha & Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Federalism under the Endangered Species Act, in THE 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND FEDERALISM, supra note 16, at 3, 11 (providing that seventeen 
states possessed imperiled species legislation in 1973). 
 125  S. REP. NO. 93-307 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2989, 2992–93. 
 126  See id. (discussing “extensive [state] programs” protecting endangered species and their 
habitat). 
 127  See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2012) (requiring EPA to approve a state’s CWA 
permit program if state law “provide[s] adequate authority to carry out” such a program). 
 128  See infra tbl.1. 
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Idaho, possesses legislation on “Species Conservation” with precise 
definitions,129 but its only function appears to be facilitating ESA species 
delisting in Idaho.130 We judged the Idaho legislation to constitute an 
imperiled species law because it concerns planning for federal hand off of 
endangered species once delisted. Delisting generally requires some habitat 
and population improvement for the listed species.131 The Idaho law 
concerns itself only with writing plans and strategies.132 No Idaho legislation 
offers any special regulatory protection to imperiled species.133 Effective 
state legislation would prevent federal listing in the first place rather than 
focus solely on delisting species that have declined to the point of requiring 
federal protection.134 Nonetheless, we employed an inclusive approach for 
identifying state imperiled species laws. Sources disagree about how many 
states have enacted “endangered species” statutes, but we hesitate to 
conclude that minor disparities between our findings and other studies 
reflect changes to legislation rather than differences in coding judgments.135 
A. Domains of Protection and Recovery Plans 
The domain of species protected under state imperiled species laws 
varies. Of the forty-six states with imperiled species laws, Idaho and Utah 
protect nothing other than ESA-listed species. However, unlike Idaho, Utah 
legislation offers a modicum of protection through a ban on illegal 
possession of protected wildlife.136 Of the remaining forty-four states, most 
 
 129  IDAHO CODE § 36-2401 (2017) (defining endangered, threatened, candidate, and listed 
species as including only species threatened pursuant to federal law). 
 130  See id. §§ 36-2402 to -2405 (establishing a delisting advisory team that is charged with 
developing a delisting management plan). 
 131  See, e.g., U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., RECOVERY PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION (2017), 
https://perma.cc/W2PN-WWFA (listing “acquiring and restoring habitat” and “breeding species 
in captivity to release them into their historic range” as tools for recovering threatened and 
endangered species). 
 132  IDAHO CODE § 36-2401. The Idaho “species conservation strategy” is a management plan 
“that describes the species needs in terms of habitat needs, population size, distribution and 
connectivity. The strategy shall include voluntary, landowner-based incentives and measures to 
achieve the management or conservation goals.” Id. § 36-2401(10). Delisting management plans 
“shall provide for the management and conservation of the species once it is delisted, and 
contain sufficient safeguards to protect the health, safety, private property and economic well-
being of the citizens of the state of Idaho.” Id. § 36-2404(1).  
 133  The Idaho legislature limits the reach of the “Species Conservation” chapter by noting 
that it shall not “be interpreted as granting the department of fish and game with new or 
additional authority.” Id. § 36-2405(7). Idaho, like most states, already bans possession of 
wildlife except where legally taken. Id. § 36-401. Because many listed animals would require 
state license for taking, there remains this indirect protection. But, it is not special to imperiled 
or even federally listed species. 
 134  Michael J. Bean, A Statute Reborn, ENVTL. F., Sept./Oct. 2017, at 31, 34. 
 135  George and Snape counted forty-six states with endangered species legislation in 2010, in 
contrast to Arha and Thompson’s count of forty-five in 2011. Compare George & Snape III, 
supra note 124, at 347, with Arha & Thompson, Jr., supra note 124, at 11. More recently, a study 
concluded that all states but West Virginia and Wyoming have endangered species laws. See 
Camacho et al., supra note 26, at 10,838. 
 136  UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-20-4.5 (West 2017). 
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either automatically include federally listed species137 or require state 
determinations of whether federally listed species should be added to their 
protective domain.138 However, all forty-four states also list species that are 
imperiled within the state but not protected under the ESA. 
Some states without specific imperiled species regulatory protections 
nonetheless have programs to list species under various categories, fund and 
engage in conservation action, and prohibit certain takes under general 
authority. For instance, Arizona has no discrete imperiled species statute. 
But Arizona’s legislative code defines endangered, threatened, and sensitive 
species;139 it creates a special funding source for conservation;140 and applies 
its general wildlife take prohibition to endangered species,141 with penalties 
equal to those for illegal takes of trophy game.142 Other state legislation is not 
self-implementing, merely empowering a state agency to make rules as it 
deems necessary to protect imperiled species.143 Our inclusive approach 
results in coding more state imperiled species legislation than we would if 
we limited ourselves to just those states possessing the key regulatory 
elements we associate with the ESA. Table 1 displays the basic attributes of 
state imperiled species legislation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 137  E.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 56:1904(A) (2017). 
 138  E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 32-960(b)(3) (2017). 
 139  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-296(2)–(4) (2017). 
 140  Id. § 17-298. 
 141  Id. § 17-101(20). 
 142  Id. § 17-314(A)(6). 
 143  E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 27-3-132(b) (2017). 
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State 
Number 
of 
imperiled 
categories 
Taxa 
below 
species 
included? 
Invertebrates 
included? 
Plants 
included? 
Status 
reporting 
frequency 
(yr) 
Recovery 
plan 
mandate? 
Habitat 
protection 
provision 
for listed 
taxa? 
AL -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
AK 1 Y Some N 2 N Y 
AZ 3 Y Some N -- N N 
AR -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
CA 3 Y Some Y 5 N N 
CO 2 Y Some N 5 N N 
CT 3 Y All Y 5 N Y 
DE 1 Y Unclear N -- N N 
FL 2 N All N 1 N N 
GA 1 N All N -- N N 
HI 4 Y All Y 1 N N 
ID 4 Y All N -- N N 
IL 2 N All Y 5 N Y 
IN 1 Y Some N 2 N N 
IA 2 Y All Y 2 N N 
KS 2 N All N 5 Y N 
KY 1 N All N -- N N 
LA 2 N All N -- N N 
ME 2 N All N -- N N 
MD 2 Y All Y -- N N 
MA 3 Y All Y 5 N Y 
MI 2 Y All Y 2 N N 
MN 3 N All Y 3 N N 
MS 1 Y Some N 2 N N 
MO 1 N All Y -- N N 
MT 1 Y Some N 2 N N 
NE 2 Y All Y -- N N 
NV 3 Y Unclear N -- N N 
NH 2 N All N -- N N 
NJ 1 Y Some N -- N N 
NM 2 Y Some N 2 Y N 
NY 3 N Some N -- N Y 
NC 3 N Some N -- Y N 
ND 2 Y All N -- N N 
OH 1 N All N -- N N 
OK 2 Y All N -- N N 
OR 2 Y Some N 5 N N 
PA 2 Y Some N -- N N 
RI 1 N All Y -- N N 
SC 1 Y Some N 2 N N 
SD 2 N All Y 2 N N 
TN 3 Y Some N 2 N N 
TX 1 Y Some N -- N N 
UT 2 N Some N -- N N 
VT 2 Y All Y -- N N 
VA 2 N Some N -- N N 
WA 1 N All N -- N N 
WV -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
WI 2 N Some Y -- N N 
WY -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Table 1: Domains of Protection and Recovery Plans in State Imperiled Species Legislation 
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The ESA geographic scope of concern for imperilment lists a species if 
it is endangered in “all or a significant portion of its range.”144 This extends 
ESA protection to a species even if just the U.S. portion of a species is at 
risk.145 Analogously, almost every state with imperiled species protection 
legislation includes species based on the risk of extirpation within the 
geographic boundaries of the state.146 But, some other species, especially 
those on the ESA list, are also included in thirty-four state lists without 
consideration of their status within state boundaries.147 Twenty-one state 
laws parallel the ESA in maintaining and protecting two lists of species: 
threatened and endangered.148 Fourteen additional states maintain a single 
list of protected species.149 Eleven other states maintain three or more lists, 
but generally only one or two categories of species receive regulatory 
protection.150 Twenty-seven states list taxa narrower than biological species, 
such as subspecies or distinct population segments, as does the ESA.151 The 
other states list only taxa at the species level.152 
The types of animals eligible for listing defy the “charismatic 
megafauna” stereotype of the species lawmakers care about protecting. 
Obscure, comical species names, such as the Delhi Sands flower-loving fly 
(Rhaphiomidas terminates abdominalis), have been emphasized to ridicule 
the comprehensive extinction-protection mission of the ESA.153 One 
legislator went so far as to state that, in 1973, “no member of Congress could 
envision application” of the ESA to “flies, mussels, snails.”154 Yet, when 
Congress enacted the ESA, it was already evident that the extinction 
 
 144  ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (2012). 
 145  Final Policy on Interpretation of the Phrase “Significant Portion of Its Range” in the 
Endangered Species Act’s Definitions of “Endangered Species” and “Threatened Species,” 79 
Fed. Reg. 37,578, 37,592 (July 1, 2014) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. ch. I and II) (noting that 
national boundaries can be the basis for designating a distinct population segment whose range 
ends at the border). 
 146  George & Snape III, supra note 124, at 347. 
 147  See id. 
 148  E.g., 34 PA. CONS. STAT. § 102 (2016) (defining the two categories of endangered species 
and threatened species in a fashion similar to the ESA). 
 149  E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 23:2A-3(c) (West 2017) (establishing just one listed category, 
“endangered species”). 
 150  E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-331(2), (8)–(9) (2017) (listing three categories and defining 
endangered species and threatened species in a fashion similar to the ESA but also including a 
listing category of “special concern species” that require monitoring but not protection from 
takes). 
 151  E.g., IOWA CODE § 481B.1(8) (2017) (defining species to include subspecies and “smaller 
taxa in common spatial arrangement that interbreed or cross-pollinate when mature”); see also 
ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) (2012). 
 152  See supra tbl.1. 
 153  Eileen Campbell, The Case of the $150,000 Fly, ECOSYSTEM MARKETPLACE (Apr. 26, 2006), 
https://perma.cc/S75Y-84BW. 
 154  James V. Hansen, Endangered Economies, 16 F. FOR APPLIED RES. & PUB. POL’Y 45, 46 
(2001). For a discussion on legislators’ attempts to rewrite the history of taxonomic breadth 
from the ESA, see Robert L. Fischman, Predictions and Prescriptions for the Endangered 
Species Act, 34 ENVTL. L. 451, 467–68 (2004). 
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problem extended to invertebrates.155 Most (forty-four of forty-six) state 
imperiled species laws clearly allow at least some invertebrates on their 
lists.156 We found two state laws ambiguous about the inclusion of 
invertebrates,157 or lacking definitions of covered species.158 Many states do 
not exclude insect pests,159 a category the ESA authorizes the Services to 
leave off of lists when their protection “would present an overwhelming and 
overriding risk to man.”160 Some states exclude other pests, such as “old 
world rats and mice of the family Muridae of the order Rodentia.”161 
Of the thirty-four states that protect plants, only fifteen do so under the 
imperiled species portion of their legislative codes.162 The other nineteen 
states have some other (often discretionary and only applicable to state 
lands) plant protection provision elsewhere in their codes.163 States often 
legislate plant protection under separate statutes for the same reason that 
the ESA has different prohibitions for plants than animals: fee simple 
absolute property holders own the plants that occur on their land.164 Many 
states’ imperiled animal regulatory programs amount to little more than 
takings prohibitions, which do not apply to plants.165 This might explain the 
 
 155  BEAN & ROWLAND, supra note 46, at 199; see also Nagle, supra note 17, at 397 (citing 
Endangered Species: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and 
the Environment of the H. Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 93d Cong. 207 (1973) 
(discussing imperiled mollusks)). Still, it was not until 1976 that FWS began listing 
invertebrates. First Invertebrate Species Listed As Endangered, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 
https://perma.cc/2H3K-X67Y (last updated June 19, 2017); e.g., Endangered Status for 159 Taxa 
of Animals, 41 Fed. Reg. 24,062, 24,064 (June 14, 1976) (listing the Curtis pearlymussel among 
many invertebrates added to the domain of the ESA). 
 156  See, e.g., ME. STAT. tit. 12, § 10001(71) (2017) (“any species of the animal kingdom”); MO. 
REV. STAT. § 252.020(3) (2017) (“all wild birds, mammals, fish and other aquatic and amphibious 
forms, and all other wild animals, regardless of classification”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 150.010(42) (2017) (“any normally undomesticated animal . . . without limitations”); cf. ALASKA 
STAT. § 16.20.190(a) (2017) (including fish or wildlife, but defining neither term); id. 
§ 16.05.940(12) (defining “fish” to include aquatic invertebrates, but not defining wildlife); CAL. 
FISH & GAME CODE § 45 (West 2017) (defining “fish” to include mollusks, crustaceans, and 
invertebrates—although it is ambiguous whether that is just marine invertebrates or all 
invertebrates); TEX. PARKS & WILD. CODE ANN. § 68.001(1) (2017) (including only mollusks and 
crustaceans among the terrestrial invertebrates eligible for listing; all aquatic animals are 
eligible). 
 157  See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 503.584(2)(a) (2017) (describing purpose as encompassing 
“fish and other vertebrate wildlife”); cf. id. § 503.585 (listing “native fish, wildlife and other 
fauna”).  
 158  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 101 (2017) (“wildlife” undefined in code). 
 159  See, e.g., IND. CODE § 14-22-34-1 (2017). 
 160  ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (2012); see also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34A-8-1(1) (2017) 
(defining “endangered species” to exclude insect pests). 
 161  WASH. REV. CODE § 77.08.010(73) (2017). 
 162  E.g., MINN. STAT. § 84.0895 subdiv. 1 (2017); see supra tbl.1. 
 163  E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53C-2-202, 65A-2-3 (West 2017) (providing discretionary 
authority to protect federally listed plants on state lands); see also CAL. FISH & GAME CODE 
§ 2062 (West 2017) (defining “endangered species” to include plants under the California 
Endangered Species Act); id. § 1904 (authorizing the designation of endangered and rare native 
plants under the California Native Plant Protection Act). 
 164  See, e.g., Falk v. Amsberry, 633 P.2d 799, 803 (Or. Ct. App. 1981). 
 165  George & Snape III, supra note 124, at 346, 353. 
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separate statutory treatment of plants. Two states, Maryland and 
Pennsylvania, implement separate acts for wildlife and for fish. This 
difference likely reflects a regional tradition rather than a legal distinction. 
Most states rely solely on their state wildlife agencies to determine 
which animals warrant protection under an imperiled species law.166 The 
ESA relies on the initiative of the Services but also provides a controversial 
petition process for citizens to force the Services to consider additions to, 
modifications of, or removals from the federal lists.167 The petition process is 
contentious because it can derail the priorities of the federal Services.168 
However, it has resulted in many listings of species that are closer to 
extinction than the ones the Services evaluate on their own.169 Only thirteen 
state imperiled species laws expressly allow citizens to petition the 
responsible agency to review the status of a listed species.170 Western states 
disproportionately legislate citizen petition procedures, which is consistent 
with the initiative and referendum tradition in that region.171 Other states 
may provide citizens the right to petition as a matter of administrative law, 
rather than within imperiled species legislation. 
Imperiled species lists must be dynamic to reflect the changes in 
species populations, habitat availability, and intensity of threats. Legislation 
in twenty-four states requires periodic administrative updates to the status 
of listed species.172 Mandates for periodic review without establishing 
deadlines are less likely to be effective or enforceable than those that 
specify a maximum time period between status reviews. Four states 
requiring monitoring do not establish deadlines.173 Of the remaining twenty 
states, the most common time periods for reporting are every two years (ten 
states), followed by every five years (seven states), one year (two states), 
and three years (one state).174 The ESA requires the Services to review the 
status of listed species every five years,175 so twenty states meet or exceed 
that standard for reporting. Though many states commit to imperiled species 
 
 166  The exception to this general rule is the thirty-seven states that automatically include in 
their lists species designated by the Services as protected under the ESA. See id. at 347. 
 167  ESA, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533(b)(3)(A) (2012).  
 168  See Eric Biber & Berry Brosi, Officious Intermeddlers or Citizen Experts? Petitions and 
Public Production of Information in Environmental Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 321, 336 (2010). 
 169  Id. at 359, 361, 378. 
 170  E.g., CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2071 (West 2017).  
 171  David B. Magleby, Let the Voters Decide? An Assessment of the Initiative and 
Referendum Process, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 13, 14–15 (1995). More than half (nine of thirteen) of 
the states with imperiled species legislation providing citizens with listing petition rights occur 
in the nineteen states in the Association of Fish and Wildlife Agencies’ western region, which 
extends from the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific Ocean. About Us, W. ASS’N FISH & WILDLIFE 
AGENCIES, https://perma.cc/5UPN-Z3KY (last visited Jan. 27, 2018); Members, W. ASS’N FISH & 
WILDLIFE AGENCIES, https://perma.cc/32MX-3LBC (last visited Jan. 27, 2018).  
 172  E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 131A, § 4 (2017) (providing that the director of the agency 
“shall review” imperiled species lists every five years). 
 173  E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 23:2A-4 (West 2017) (“The commissioner shall periodically review 
the State list of endangered species and may by regulation amend the list making such additions 
or deletions as are deemed appropriate.”). 
 174  See supra tbl.1. 
 175  ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(c)(2) (2012). 
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monitoring in SWAPs, which are revised every ten years,176 states identify 
species-specific information as among their greatest unmet needs.177 
Particularly because many states within a region may have the same species 
on their lists, coordination among states would improve understanding of 
species status at both the regional and national level.178 The ESA already 
mandates that the Services implement a system in cooperation with states 
for status monitoring of delisted species.179 
Recovery plans typically set the benchmarks for moving a species out 
of an imperiled category. The ESA requires a plan for all listed species 
except those whose recovery would not be advanced by one.180 The Services 
frequently collaborate with state agencies in recovery planning and may 
include other appropriate people on recovery planning teams.181 States have 
been particularly critical of tardy issuance of federal recovery plans.182 
Congress is currently considering bills that would allow states to claim 
exclusive authority to develop or implement recovery plans for intrastate 
species.183 Our research suggests that few states have experience with 
directing recovery planning. Only three states’ laws require that agencies 
prepare recovery plans for their own imperiled species.184 We coded 
generously, and included in our tally of recovery-plan mandates even New 
Mexico’s provision, which requires only the development of recovery plans 
“to the extent practicable.”185 However, we excluded Maine’s recovery plan 
requirement because it applies only to a narrow class of imperiled species, 
those that will be conserved using “transplantation, introduction or 
reintroduction.”186 Many state statutes provide general guidance about 
developing an imperiled species program that requires relevant agencies to 
“plan” for recovery.187 However, we did not consider these common 
 
 176  Id. § 669c(d)(1)(D)(vi). 
 177  Meretsky et al., supra note 35, at 973. 
 178  Id. at 973–74. 
 179  16 U.S.C. § 1533(g). 
 180  Id. § 1533(f)(1). 
 181  Id. § 1533(f)(2). The Services’ cooperative federalism policy is to utilize “the expertise 
and solicit the information and participation of State agencies in all aspects of the recovery 
planning process for all species under their jurisdiction.” Revised Interagency Cooperative 
Policy Regarding the Role of State Agencies in Endangered Species Act Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 
8663, 8664 (Feb. 22, 2016) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. ch. IV). 
 182  See, e.g., WGA POLICY RESOLUTION, supra note 2, at 5–6 (recommending completion of 
recovery plans within one year of listing and calling for clearer recovery goals). 
 183  See Endangered Species Management Self-Determination Act, S. 935, 115th Cong. 
§ 4(j)(2)(B) (2017); H.R. 2134, 115th Cong. § 4(j)(2)(B) (2017). 
 184  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 32-960 (2017); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 17-2-40.1 (2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-
333 (2017). 
 185  E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 17-2-40.1(G) (also requiring that final plans be prepared within 
two years after listing). 
 186  ME. STAT. tit. 12, § 12804(1)(D) (2017).  
 187  E.g., 520 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/11(a) (2016) (stating that the department “shall actively plan 
and implement a program for the conservation of endangered and threatened species, by means 
which should include published data search, research, management, cooperative agreements 
with other agencies, identification, protection and acquisition of essential habitat, support of 
beneficial legislation, issuance of grants from appropriated funds, and education of the public”).  
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provisions to compel recovery plans unless the legislation expressly 
identified a recovery plan as a particular type of mandatory document. 
Critical habitat under the ESA provides limited additional protections 
for listed species only through its narrow applicability in the consultation 
process. In addition to proscribing jeopardy, ESA section 7 demands that 
federal agency actions not result in adverse modification of critical habitat.188 
Critical habitat is irrelevant to section 9 prohibitions. Yet it plays an outsized 
role in opposition to the ESA when landowners find their property within 
mapped areas designated for critical habitat, and potentially subject to the 
adverse modification test in seeking federal permits.189 Most state 
legislatures wish to avoid such controversy. But, habitat degradation is the 
leading threat to U.S. imperiled species.190 We coded generously to include 
all habitat-protecting provisions for listed taxa, even if no agency formally 
maps covered habitat as the Services must do under the ESA, and regardless 
of how the protection applies. For instance, we counted as a habitat-
protection provision Alaska legislation mandating commissioners “take 
measures to preserve the natural habitat” of imperiled species.191 Still, only 
five states legislate habitat protection for imperiled species.192 
B. Interagency Consultation 
Consultation between the Services and other federal agencies under the 
ESA is framed as “interagency cooperation” in section 7 to ensure that 
government actions and funding do not undermine the national policy of 
extinction prevention.193 Table 2 shows similar coordination requirements 
among state agencies in eleven state legislative codes.194 The northeastern 
states disproportionately impose strong interagency cooperation 
requirements. The strength of ESA section 7 is that it marries a detailed, 
required procedure with a substantive threshold limiting agency impacts; 
agency actions must not jeopardize the continued existence of listed species 
or adversely modify critical habitat.195 We did not categorize as interagency 
cooperation state legislation that merely requires cooperation without 
 
 188  ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012). 
 189  See, e.g., Home Builders Ass’n of N. Cal. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 616 F.3d 983, 986 
(9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that a party “must consult with the appropriate expert wildlife 
agency before any” action can be taken regarding critical habitat).  
 190  Wilcove et al., supra note 74, at 607–09 (noting habitat degradation is a threat to 85% of 
imperiled species); see also NOSS ET AL., supra note 74, at 2, 5–7 & fig.1.1; NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL ET AL., supra note 74, at 7, 35–38, 40. 
 191  ALASKA STAT. § 16.20.185 (2017). 
 192  Cf. George & Snape III, supra note 124, at 348–49 (tallying six states with critical habitat 
designation provisions employing a coding definition that appears closer to the ESA approach). 
 193  16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1). 
 194  Cf. George & Snape III, supra note 124, at 352 (tallying eight states with interagency 
consultation requirements); Camacho et al., supra note 26, at 10,839 (tallying twelve states with 
interagency consultation requirements). Our tally of state legislation for interagency 
cooperation includes Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, 
New Hampshire, Oregon, Vermont, and Wisconsin. 
 195  16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). 
7_TOJCI.FISCHMAN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/3/2018 10:00 AM 
106 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 48:81 
specifying either a procedure or a substantive threshold of impacts to be 
avoided.196 Of the eleven states requiring interagency cooperation, all impose 
some kind of substantive threshold beyond which adverse impacts to 
imperiled species will not be tolerated.197 Most of the eleven states adopt the 
same substantive jeopardy standard as the ESA itself.198 
Like the ESA, most states have an exemption or variance procedure to 
allow otherwise legal, but substantively barred, state actions to proceed.199 
Three of the eleven states do not establish any particular procedures for 
state agencies to determine whether their actions, programs, or grants might 
cross the threshold into impermissible adverse impacts on imperiled 
species.200 Some state laws, as with the ESA, clearly include agency 
permitting as an action subject to substantive standards.201 This is important 
because state permitting decisions are likely to most directly address private 
habitat-disturbing developments. However, other state legislation is 
ambiguous about whether the scope of agency actions subject to 
interagency consultation includes permitting.202 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 196  E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 29.1-570 (West 2017) (mandating cooperation but without a 
procedure to formalize cooperation or a substantive threshold). Other states require 
interagency coordination on only narrowly circumscribed matters. E.g., FLA. STAT. 
§ 379.2291(4)(c) (2017) (establishing discretionary interagency coordination for establishing 
road speed limits to protect listed species).  
 197  E.g., ME. STAT. tit. 12, § 12806(1)(A) (2017) (prohibiting state agencies or municipal 
governments from permitting, funding, or carrying out projects that will significantly alter 
designated habitat or violate protection guidelines for an imperiled species). 
 198  E.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 37-807(3) (2017) (providing that all state agencies must “insure 
that actions authorized, funded, or carried out by them do not jeopardize the continued 
existence of such endangered or threatened species or result in the destruction or modification 
of habitat of such species which is determined by the commission to be critical”); HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 195D-5(b)(2) (2017) (providing that all state agencies must “ensure that actions 
authorized, funded, or carried out by them do not jeopardize the continued existence of 
[imperiled] species”). Hawaii, however, like most states, neither designates critical habitat nor 
includes it as part of the substantive threshold. 
 199  Compare 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)(1)–(10) (providing the federal agency action exemption 
process and standards), with, e.g., ME. STAT. tit. 12, § 12806 (providing a variance from the 
substantive limitations on state action after a public hearing and commissioner certification 
that the action would not pose a significant risk of extinction). 
 200  See infra tbl.2. 
 201  E.g., ME. STAT. tit. 12, § 12806. 
 202  See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 29.604(6r)(a) (2017). 
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State 
No consultation 
requirement 
Substantive 
standard only 
Procedural and 
substantive 
standards 
AL X 
AK X 
AZ X 
AR X 
CA X 
CO X 
CT  X 
DE X 
FL X 
GA X 
HI  X 
ID X 
IL  X 
IN X 
IA X 
KS X 
KY X 
LA X 
ME  X 
MD  X 
MA  X 
MI X 
MN X 
MS X 
MO X 
MT X 
NE  X 
NV X 
NH  X 
NJ X 
NM X 
NY X 
NC X 
ND X 
OH X 
OK X 
OR  X 
PA X 
RI X 
SC X 
SD X 
TN X 
TX X 
UT X 
VT  X 
VA X 
WA X 
WV X 
WI  X 
WY X     
Table 2: Interagency Coordination Requirements in State Imperiled Species Legislation 
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Among the eight states with both procedural and substantive elements 
of interagency cooperation, there are some strong provisions that can serve 
as models for others seeking to strengthen imperiled species conservation.203 
For instance, Massachusetts requires action agencies to “use all practicable 
means and measures to avoid or minimize damage to [state-listed] 
species.”204 Wisconsin’s substantive requirement for state agency action is 
even broader, prohibiting jeopardy to the species and adverse modification 
to critical habitat, but also jeopardy to “the whole plant–animal community 
of which [the species] is a part.”205 Wisconsin also requires that the state 
“alleviate, to the maximum extent practicable under the circumstances, any 
potential adverse effect” on the state-listed species when a “taking” occurs.206 
This provision mirrors the incidental take statement program of ESA section 
7.207 
C. Prohibited Acts and Permits 
Prohibited acts of the kind banned by ESA section 9 vary from state to 
state. The term “take” has deep roots in wildlife law and originally applied 
solely to active pursuit through such activities as hunting, fishing, and 
trapping.208 Most state imperiled species legislation bans take, but that fact is 
unrevealing because states define the term differently (or not at all). 
Moreover, legislation itself may not reveal the full extent of activities 
affected by take bans. For instance, the ESA definition of take, by itself, 
does not expressly reveal whether habitat destruction falls under the 
prohibition.209 Instead, Service rulemaking is the key authority for extending 
the ESA take prohibition to certain kinds of habitat modification.210 Because, 
overall, the most important role states could serve in endangered species 
recovery is controlling land-use degradation of habitat, this is the single 
most important category for indicating how well states could contribute to 
greater cooperative federalism in the ESA. As previously noted, some state 
legislation does not even ban killing an imperiled species but merely 
empowers agencies to implement such a ban.211 Because our study did not 
analyze agency rules or enforcement proceedings, there remains ambiguity 
 
 203  E.g., ME. STAT. tit. 12, § 12806(1)(A) (prohibiting state agencies or municipal 
governments from permitting, funding, or carrying out projects that will significantly alter 
designated habitat or violate protection guidelines for an imperiled species). 
 204  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 131A, § 4 (2017). 
 205  WIS. STAT. § 29.604(6r)(a). 
 206  Id. § 29.604(6r)(d). 
 207  See ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4) (2012). 
 208  2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *411 (“[E]very man . . . has an equal right of 
pursuing, and taking to his own use, all such creatures as are ferae naturae . . . .”), quoted in 
Sweet Home, 515 U.S. 687, 717 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 209  See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19); see also supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text. 
 210  50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2016). 
 211  E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 27-3-132 (2017) (empowering a board to make rules to protect 
imperiled species, but limiting them to “to the regulation of the capture, killing, or selling of 
protected species and the protection of the habitat of the species on public lands”). 
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associated with the actual extent to which prohibited acts provisions 
actually protect state-listed species.212 However, we were able to distinguish 
four different types of prohibitions in statutes: 1) trafficking; 2) purposeful 
actions designed to capture or kill wildlife; 3) broader bans suggesting 
habitat concerns; and 4) a special category of prohibitions that include 
“lesser acts,” such as “disturbing” wildlife, which one influential court 
decision interpreted to ban significant habitat modification.213 
The most common category of prohibited acts in state statutes is 
trafficking. Trafficking is illegal commercial trading, which legislation 
typically controls through limitations on the ability to import, export, sell, 
buy, offer to sell or buy, deliver, carry, or transport wildlife.214 Even in the 
United States, trafficking remains a threat to many imperiled species, such 
as freshwater turtles desired in Asian medicinal and food markets, or fish 
harvested for edible roe.215 Table 3 shows that legislation in forty-one states 
prohibits imperiled species trafficking. The nine states with no trafficking 
prohibition for imperiled species include the four states with no imperiled 
species protective legislation (Alabama, Arkansas, West Virginia, and 
Wyoming) and Idaho (which concerns itself only with promoting federal 
delisting). The remaining four states (Arizona, Florida, Nevada, and North 
Dakota) contain other sorts of prohibitions designed to protect imperiled 
species from illegal commercial activity. For instance, Arizona’s general 
legislative provisions for “fish and game” specify the very highest civil 
penalties for possession of illegally taken trophy or endangered animals.216 
Most states prohibit selling, buying, or possessing any wild animal (or 
animal part) without a permit or some other permission from a state 
agency.217 Most states have some sort of penalties for illegal commerce 
generally. 
 
 
 212  For example, Maryland legislation prohibits take, which it defines similarly to the ESA 
definition: “[H]arass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to 
attempt to engage in any such conduct.” MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. §§ 10-2A-01(k), 10-2A-05 
(LexisNexis 2017). However, one would need to read the agency regulation to learn that it 
interprets harm to include some forms of significant habitat modification. MD. CODE REGS. 
08.03.08.01(6)(b) (2017). 
 213  Sour Mountain Realty, Inc., 714 N.Y.S.2d 78, 81 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).  
 214  See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (prohibiting most of these acts). 
 215  See Inclusion of Four Native U.S. Freshwater Turtle Species in Appendix III of the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), 81 
Fed. Reg. 32,664, 32,667–668 (May 24, 2016) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 23) (describing 
trafficking threats to the turtles); NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., FINAL RECOVERY PLAN FOR THE 
SHORTNOSE STURGEON 45 (1998) (describing poaching for endangered shortnosed sturgeon roe), 
https://perma.cc/847L-XZ42.  
 216  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-314 (2017). 
 217  E.g., FLA. STAT. § 379.3762 (2017) (generally prohibiting personal possession of Florida 
wildlife without a permit, subject to certain exceptions). 
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Table 3: Prohibited Acts and Permits in State Imperiled Species Legislation 
State 
Trafficking 
prohibited? 
Purposeful 
pursuit 
prohibited? 
Incidental 
habitat 
modification 
clearly 
prohibited? 
‘Take” 
definition 
includes 
“harm” 
Take definition 
includes 
“lesser acts,” 
such as 
“disturbing” 
Incidental take 
permit 
authorized? 
AL            
AK X X     
AZ  X     
AR       
CA X X    X 
CO X X     
CT X X  X   
DE X      
FL  X     
GA X X     
HI X X  X  X 
ID       
IL X X  X  X 
IN X X     
IA X X  X   
KS X X     
KY X      
LA X X     
ME X X X   X 
MD X X  X   
MA X X X X  X 
MI X X  X   
MN X X     
MS X X     
MO X      
MT X X     
NE X X  X   
NV  X     
NH X X   X  
NJ X X     
NM X X     
NY X X   X  
NC X X  X   
ND       
OH X X     
OK X X   X  
OR X X    X 
PA X X     
RI X      
SC X X     
SD X X     
TN X X     
TX X X     
UT X X     
VT X X   X  
VA X X     
WA X X     
WV       
WI X X    X 
WY             
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The second category of prohibitions applies to hunting and other 
purposeful actions (and usually intent to act) to reduce an imperiled species 
to possession (i.e., capture or kill). The common law of wildlife typically 
required this kind of effort in order for a person to claim ownership in an 
animal or animal part.218 The key phrases expressing this active pursuit are 
pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect.219 This roughly 
corresponds to the ESA section 9 prohibitions except for “harm” and 
“harass,” which lend themselves to broader interpretations embracing 
incidental effects.220 Other commonly occurring terms in this purposeful 
category under state law include fish, harvest, snare, and net.221 If a statute 
required purposeful intent (e.g., employing words of direct action, such as 
kill or pursue), we coded it for active, intent-driven prohibition.222 Actions 
intended to kill or wound an animal remain a threat for imperiled species 
such as prairie dogs and wolves.223 
Purposeful actions, and their attempts, to take wild animals (other than 
those considered pests or vermin) are generally prohibited under state 
wildlife law, which typically bans people from engaging in the activities 
without a license.224 States will not offer licenses to pursue or hunt most 
nongame wildlife, which compose the vast majority of animals on state 
imperiled species lists.225 In order to home in on imperiled species programs, 
we coded only special prohibitions applying to imperiled species. This rules 
out the four states with no programs and Idaho.226 In addition to those states, 
five others have no special prohibitions on active pursuit of imperiled 
species.227 Colorado’s imperiled species law bans “take” in a provision that 
otherwise only addresses trafficking.228 It defines “take” in a generally 
applicable part of the “Parks and Wildlife” title as “to acquire possession.”229 
 
 218  See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175, 178 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (ruling that “actual bodily seizure 
is not indispensable to acquire right to, or possession of wild beasts; but that, on the contrary, 
the mortal wounding of such beasts, by one not abandoning his pursuit, may, with the utmost 
propriety, be deemed possession of him; since thereby, the pursuer manifests an unequivocal 
intention of appropriating the animal to his individual use, has deprived him of his natural 
liberty, and brought him within his certain control”). 
 219  See id. 
 220  ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2012); 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2016). 
 221  E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-13-2 (West 2017). 
 222  E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 27-3-132(b) (2017) (prohibiting “capture” and “killing”); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 23-13-2(48)(a) (“hunt, pursue, harass, catch, capture, possess, angle, seine, trap, or kill 
any protected wildlife”). 
 223  Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Endangered Status for the Mexican 
Wolf, 80 Fed. Reg. 2488, 2496 (Jan. 16, 2015) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17); Endangered and 
Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Rule to Reclassify the Utah Prairie Dog as Threatened, 
with Special Rule to Allow Regulated Taking, 49 Fed. Reg. 22,330, 22,330–31 (May 29, 1984) (to 
be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). 
 224  E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-19-1(1). 
 225  E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-314 (2017) (imposing civil penalties for illegally taking, 
wounding, killing or possessing nongame animals and endangered species animals). 
 226  See supra notes 128–133 and accompanying text. 
 227  Delaware, Kentucky, Missouri, North Dakota, and Rhode Island. See supra tbl.3. 
 228  COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-2-105(3)–(4) (2017). 
 229  Id. § 33-1-102(43). 
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We tallied this ambiguous provision as a purposeful pursuit for killing or 
collecting. Four states ban commerce in imperiled species but not active 
pursuit.230 
The third and fourth categories of prohibitions are those that may or do 
prohibit certain forms of habitat degradation. Ordinarily, people impair 
habitat for imperiled species in the service of other, economically 
productive purposes. Therefore, the key interpretive question is whether 
legislative prohibitions apply to harms or disturbances that are incidental to 
an otherwise lawful purpose, such as farming, logging, or real estate 
development. Unfortunately, this important issue is difficult to code because 
of ambiguity over what text might actually ban incidental adverse impacts 
on imperiled species. For instance, the definition of Colorado’s take ban 
expressly excludes “the accidental wounding or killing of wildlife by a motor 
vehicle, vessel, or train.”231 One could interpret the exclusion to mean that 
other forms of accidental wounding of wildlife are prohibited implicitly 
under the expressio unius canon of construction.232 But an agency is likely 
not compelled to make that interpretation.233 We did not count Colorado 
among states with legislation prohibiting incidental take through habitat 
degradation because we are interested in clearer legislative judgments 
rather than mere openings for agency discretion that could possibly be used 
to regulate incidental takes. 
Other state statutes prohibit take and define the term to include “harm,” 
the verb that the Services interpret to include certain forms of significant 
habitat modification.234 Some states agencies make the same interpretation 
of “harm.”235 Other states do not make regulatory interpretations of “harm.”236 
A recent study from the Center for Land, Environment, and Natural 
Resources of the University of California, Irvine School of Law reviewed 
state regulations and found five states that interpret terms of their 
prohibitions to ban forms of significant habitat alteration.237 We found nine 
 
 230  Delaware, Kentucky, Missouri, and Rhode Island. See supra tbl.3; see, e.g., MO. REV. 
STAT. § 252.240(1)–(2) (2017) (prohibiting trafficking of imperiled species). Missouri bans active 
pursuit of wildlife without a permit but has no provision that applies specifically to imperiled 
species. See MO. REV. STAT. § 252.040. 
 231  COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-1-102(43).  
 232  ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 119, at 375 (defining expressio unius as “expression of 
one thing suggests the exclusion of others”); see, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 
U.S. 105, 114–19 (2001) (holding that a statutory provision that excludes specifically listed 
employment contracts indicates that the law implicitly includes all other contracts). 
 233  An agency might decide that the legislative history indicates that the transportation 
sector objected to the broad language and received an exemption because it asked for 
clarification.  
 234  50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2016); see, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 37-802(6) (2017). 
 235  E.g., MD. CODE REGS. 08.03.08.01(6)(b) (2017) (“Harm includes an act that significantly 
modifies or degrades a habitat thereby killing or injuring wildlife . . . .”). 
 236  See, e.g., 163 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 4-004 (2017) (providing no regulatory interpretation of 
“harm”). 
 237  Camacho et al, supra note 26, at 10,841. 
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state statutory definitions of take that include “harm,”238 and all but one 
would be amenable to administrative interpretations that include incidental 
habitat impacts.239 
Only one state, Massachusetts, clearly prohibits habitat degradation, at 
least in specially designated areas. Massachusetts bans take, which it 
defines to include “disrupt the nesting, breeding, feeding or migratory 
activity,” “harass,” and “harm.”240 Massachusetts’s implementing agency does 
protect habitat through this provision.241 But, in addition to any incidental 
take liability, the statute also declares that “no person may alter significant 
habitat.”242 The geographic extent of “significant habitat” is limited to 
specially designated areas, akin to the ESA’s “critical habitat.”243 However, 
the state has failed to designate any “significant habitat” to implement the 
direct ban on habitat alteration.244 
Though it does not mention habitat, Maine defines “take” to include 
“the act or omission that results in the death of any endangered or 
threatened species,” even if unintentional.245 This prohibition is similar to the 
Services’ interpretation of the ESA ban to include “an act which actually 
kills . . . wildlife . . . [which] may include significant habitat modification or 
degradation where it actually kills.”246 The Maine incidental take permit 
provision leads us to interpret the prohibition to include at least some 
incidental habitat degradation.247 Nevada bans imperiled species from being 
“captured, removed, or destroyed at any time by any means, except under 
special permit.”248 Nevada legislation does not expressly provide for an 
incidental take permit, but the agency director does appear to have authority 
 
 238  Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, and 
North Carolina prohibit harm to imperiled species. See supra tbl.3. 
 239  North Carolina’s statute defines prohibited “take” as “[a]ll operations during, 
immediately preparatory, and immediately subsequent to an attempt, whether successful or not, 
to capture, kill, pursue, hunt, or otherwise harm or reduce to possession.” N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 113-130(7) (2017). Therefore, we concluded that “harm” in this context excludes incidental 
habitat alteration. The state regulations support this interpretation. 15A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 
10I.0102 (2017). 
 240  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 131A, §§ 1–2 (2017). 
 241  321 MASS. CODE REGS. 10.11–.26 (2017); see Pepin v. Div. of Fisheries & Wildlife, 4 N.E.3d 
875, 881–83 (Mass. 2014) (explaining how the habitat protection program works in the context 
of take permits). 
 242  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 131A, § 2; see Pepin, 4 N.E.3d at 881–83, 887 nn.8 & 9 (explaining 
that the prohibition on alteration of significant habitat provides additional protection separate 
from the take prohibition, though both operate in practice through mitigation in permit 
conditions). 
 243  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 131A, § 1. 
 244  321 MASS. CODE REGS. 10.99. 
 245  ME. STAT. tit. 12, § 12808 (2017). 
 246  50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2016). Though the Services define harm as resulting from an “act,” they 
define the “harass” element of the ESA definition of take as including omissions as well. Id. On 
the significance of the “omission” element in prohibited activities, see Sweet Home, 515 U.S. 
687, 716–20 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 247  See ME. STAT. tit. 12, § 12808 (including both acts and omissions that result in death of 
endangered or threatened species in the definition of “take”). 
 248  NEV. REV. STAT. § 503.585 (2017). 
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to issue one as a “special permit.”249 The legislation, which does not define 
“destroyed,” is thus ambiguous as to incidental takes; neither the prohibition 
nor the permitting directly addresses anything about incidental intent or 
habitat degradation. We coded only the Massachusetts and Maine legislative 
bans on incidental habitat impairment to be at least as stringent as the 
Services’ interpretation of harm. 
Four states share prohibitions of “take” where the legislation defines 
the term to include “lesser acts,” such as “disturbing” and other verbs.250 This 
is our fourth category. One of those states, New York, interpreted this 
formulation to include at least some habitat modifications. The widely cited 
case of State v. Sour Mountain Realty, Inc.251 upheld an injunction against a 
mine that erected a fence to keep state-listed rattlesnakes from making their 
seasonal migration to their summer range on mine property.252 Relying on the 
“plain and obvious” meaning of the statute, as well as legislative history that 
indicated an intent to complement the ESA, the state appellate court stated 
that “habitat interference” may sometimes rise to the level of a state-banned 
“take.”253 This raises the possibility that—in addition to New York, New 
Hampshire, Oklahoma, and Vermont—other states may ban incidental takes 
under their legislation. 
The mere presence of an ambiguous term, such as “harm,” “harass,” or 
“worry,” does not indicate whether the state legislation actually sustains the 
same regulatory or judicial interpretation as the ESA. On the other hand, the 
absence of these and like terms generally precludes enforcement against 
otherwise lawful habitat-disturbing activities.254 Therefore, we conclude that, 
at most, thirteen state imperiled species laws could be clearly construed to 
prohibit incidental takes, but may not necessarily be interpreted in that 
manner.255 
 
 249  Id. 
 250  N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207:1 (2017); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 11-0103 (McKinney 
2017); OKLA. STAT. tit. 29, § 2-118 (2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 4001(23) (2017). 
 251  714 N.Y.S.2d 78 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).  
 252  Id. at 80, 84. On the importance of the decision, see generally Christopher A. Amato & 
Robert Rosenthal, Endangered Species Protection in New York After State v. Sour Mountain 
Realty, Inc., 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 117 (2001). 
 253  Sour Mountain Realty, Inc., 714 N.Y.S.2d at 81–83. 
 254  E.g., Animal Rights Front, Inc. v. Jacques, 869 A.2d 679, 681–82 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005) 
(rejecting application of state imperiled species legislation to private habitat disturbance based 
on the clear meaning of the statute); Opinion No. 94-605, 78 Cal. Attorney Gen. 137, 139, 142 
(1995) (interpreting the California legislative prohibition on “take, possess, purchase, or sell” as 
excluding habitat modification, relying on a code definition of “take” as “hunt, pursue, catch, 
capture, or kill,” or attempts). The California attorney general opinion was largely endorsed by 
the court in San Bernardino Valley Audubon Society v. City of Moreno Valley, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
897, 904 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (reasoning that the omission by the legislature demonstrated the 
prohibition does not cover habitat modification). 
 255  Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, New York, Oklahoma, and Vermont. See supra tbl.3; supra note 239 and 
accompanying text; cf. Camacho et al., supra note 26, at 10,841 (concluding that five states 
clearly prohibit significant habitat modification and five state prohibitions are ambiguous but 
may prohibit harm). 
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Seven state laws provide specifically for incidental take permits. They 
include Maine and Massachusetts, which supports our interpretation of their 
statutory prohibitions.256 Like Justice Stevens in Babbitt v. Sweet Home 
Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon,257 we regard the enactment of 
such permit programs to indicate that legislators intended the statutory 
prohibitions to include incidental takes.258 If they did not, then there would 
be no need for citizens to secure permits to legally proceed with otherwise 
lawful activities.259 It is difficult to imagine an effective program for 
protecting imperiled species habitat without some kind of permit to allow 
economic development to move forward. Some states ban incidental takes 
without including either “harm” or “lesser acts” in prohibitions. For instance, 
California’s imperiled species legislation prohibits take, which is defined as 
“hunt, pursue, catch, capture, or kill, or attempt to hunt, pursue, catch, 
capture, or kill.”260 California’s statutory incidental take permit program 
focuses on situations where there is actually a showing of a killing or 
likelihood of a killing that occurred or may occur as part of an otherwise 
lawful activity.261 Only habitat degradation that results in the death of 
individual members of a listed species would need an incidental take permit 
to proceed legally in California.262 Nonetheless, real estate developers do 
apply for permits despite the difficulties of proving an actual killing.263 
Other states, such as Nevada, may permit incidental takes as a matter of 
administrative discretion but do not have express legislative authority.264 
Unlike Florida and Arkansas, the commission responsible for Nevada 
wildlife rulemaking does not have regulatory power outside of its statutory 
 
 256  In addition to Maine and Massachusetts, California, Hawaii, Illinois, Oregon, and 
Wisconsin have legislative incidental take permit programs. See supra tbl.3.  
 257  515 U.S. 687 (1995). 
 258  Id. at 700–01. 
 259  The important exception to this principle, noted below, is those state regulatory 
commissions that possess constitutional power to prohibit actions without express legislative 
authorization. See infra note 290. 
 260  CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 86 (West 2017). California prohibits “take, possess, purchase, 
or sell” in a sentence that includes other trafficking terms. Id. § 2080. California then defines 
take to mean “hunt, pursue, catch, capture, or kill, or attempt to hunt, pursue, catch, capture, or 
kill.” Id. § 86. 
 261  Id. § 2081(b); Dep’t of Fish & Game v. Anderson-Cottonwood Irrigation Dist., 11 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 222, 230–31 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (applying the take prohibition’s ban on “kill” to an 
irrigation that incidentally entrapped salmon in irrigation pumps, killing the fish). 
 262  Sierra Club v. City of Palm Desert, No. E052300, 2012 WL 951502, at *28 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Mar. 21, 2012) (denying a claim that construction of a real estate development would result in 
the killing of a bighorn sheep due to stress or habituation to people because the challengers 
failed to present sufficient evidence to establish a causal connection to a death of an individual 
sheep). 
 263  See, e.g., Envtl. Council of Sacramento v. City of Sacramento, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 544, 546–
47 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (upholding a permit for a large-scale real estate development in the 
Natomas Basin). 
 264  NEV. REV. STAT. § 503.585 (2017) (authorizing the commission to issue “special permits” 
for take). 
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authority.265 Some of the seven state laws that mandate incidental take 
programs grant broad discretion to the agency and do not require habitat 
conservation plans.266 Five of the seven incidental take permit provisions 
expressly require a habitat conservation plan in order to receive the 
permit.267 Wisconsin’s incidental take permits, for instance, closely tracks the 
terms of ESA section 10 in requiring: a habitat conservation plan, 
minimization and mitigation of takings impacts to the maximum extent 
practicable, assurance of adequate funding for the plan, that consultation 
thresholds are met, and “[a]ny other measures that the department may 
determine to be necessary or appropriate.”268 Illinois’s incidental take permit 
criteria similarly track the ESA program.269 Of the seven states with 
legislation authorizing incidental take permits, only Hawaii, Illinois, and 
Massachusetts have clear statutory prohibitions on “harm,” and none 
prohibits lesser acts.270 
Other types of permits, such as for public safety, scientific study, or 
education are common in state codes. Only California, Hawaii, and Kansas 
expressly authorize programs similar to federal safe-harbor agreements, 
which provide landowners with incentives to maintain or enhance 
unoccupied imperiled species habitat in exchange for a liability shield.271 
Some states, such as Colorado, implement other special permit programs to 
alleviate the burden on landowners to coexist with imperiled species.272 
VI. DISCUSSION 
Our findings support the conclusions of other researchers that, on the 
whole, state imperiled species legislation is weaker than the ESA, “lacking in 
regulatory teeth and policy innovation.”273 Compared to the key regulatory 
 
 265  Id. § 501.181(4) (2017) (providing the commission authority to “[e]stablish regulations 
necessary to carry out” certain parts of the Nevada statutory code). 
 266  E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 496.172(4) (2017) (mandating the agency “establish a system of 
state permits for incidental taking of state-designated . . . species . . . under such terms and 
conditions as the commission determines will minimize the impact on the species taken”). 
 267  Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 195D-4(g) 
(2017); 520 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/5.5(a) (2016); ME. STAT. tit. 12, § 12808-A(2) (2017); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 131A, § 5(a) (2017); WIS. STAT. § 29.604(6m)(c) (2017). California’s law is a bit 
convoluted because it implies that the state agency may issue incidental permits without a 
habitat conservation plan, but authorizes incidental takes for actions compliant with a natural 
communities conservation plan and other wildlife plans. CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 2081.1 (West 
2017).  
 268  WIS. STAT. § 29.604(6m). The Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources issues, in 
addition to individual permits, “broad incidental take” authorizations for common activities. 
Incidental Take Permit/Authorization (ITP/A), WIS. DEP’T NAT. RESOURCES, 
https://perma.cc/D7F8-7WMC (last revised May 31, 2016). 
 269  See 520 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/5.5.  
 270  See HAW. REV. STAT. § 195D-4; 520 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/5.5; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 131A, § 5. 
 271  E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 32-962(b)(1)(B) (2017). 
 272  See COLO. REV. STAT. § 33-1-106 (2017) (permits to alleviate damage to property). 
 273  Ruhl, supra note 18, at 36; see also George & Snape III, supra note 124, at 355–56 
(concluding that state legislation is far from comprehensive and needs greater authority to fill 
programmatic gaps). 
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programs of the ESA that prompt stakeholders to collaborate on 
conservation across property and jurisdictional boundaries, state laws in 
general reflect a more permissive attitude. Of the forty-six states possessing 
legislation protecting imperiled animals, only eleven require interagency 
consultation for state actions. Only nine prohibit harm, and only two of 
those clearly prohibit incidental take. Seven state laws provide for incidental 
take permits, but only five of those programs require habitat conservation 
plans for permit issuance. Unless the aim of proponents of ESA delegation is 
to undermine recovery, state legislative reform will need to precede greater 
devolution of federal authority over imperiled species. 
Though current state laws, in aggregate, would not adequately replace 
the operative provisions of the ESA under cooperative federalism, some 
state provisions are very strong. Particularly strong provisions from 
individual states would support pilot delegation of some ESA programs. 
They also provide excellent templates for legislative reform. A program that 
works in another state may be a much more appealing model for state 
statutory revision than duplication of the federal ESA text. The states in the 
vanguard of protective imperiled species legislation are Illinois, 
Massachusetts, Oregon, and Wisconsin. They are the four states that both 
combine procedural and substantive requirements for state agency actions 
and also provide incidental take permits. The Oregon legislation is 
somewhat weaker than the other three because it does not require a habitat 
conservation plan for an incidental take permit. Hawaii could reasonably be 
included in the vanguard states, despite its lack of a statutory procedure for 
implementing its substantive interagency consultation standard, because of 
its combination of a statutory harm prohibition and a statutory incidental 
take permit program. In other respects, these states go beyond the ESA in 
devising promising programs for species recovery. 
For instance, Oregon legislation requires the state Fish and Game 
Commission to adopt rules setting “quantifiable and measurable 
guidelines . . . necessary to ensure the survival of [imperiled] species.”274 
Those guidelines serve as the substantive standards for agency consultation. 
This mandate to provide guidelines through rules is a model even for ESA 
reform. Currently, under the ESA, action agencies may have little guidance 
before consultation on how the Services might apply the jeopardy standard 
to a particular species. Action agencies may better constrain their proposed 
activities to meet the jeopardy standard if they knew quantitative thresholds 
of jeopardy or adverse modification of habitat in advance. Quantifiable 
standards would establish monitoring benchmarks to determine whether 
effects predicted in the consultation analysis actually occurred. They could 
serve as the backbone for an adaptive management program to adjust 
treatments designed to prevent extinctions.275 This is because a common 
 
 274  OR. REV. STAT. § 496.182(2)(a) (2017). 
 275  Adaptive management is an iterative procedure for treating actions as experiments from 
which resource managers can learn and narrow uncertainty about modeling effects over time. 
See J.B. Ruhl & Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in the Courts, 95 MINN. L. REV. 424, 
429–30 (2010) (describing adaptive management and highlighting the consensus among scholars 
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hurdle for adaptive management success is the dearth of measurable 
triggers to force reevaluation of actions, beginning another iteration of the 
learning cycle.276 The Oregon provision would help cure this problem in 
adaptive management practice. Also, under ESA section 9, courts have 
struggled with the extent of habitat alteration that constitutes prohibited 
harm. One of us has recommended that the Services themselves indicate 
what extent (size and intensity) of habitat disturbance triggers the 
significance threshold for harm.277 The Oregon approach, if implemented 
better, may point a way forward. Currently, however, the Oregon 
Department of Fish and Wildlife has promulgated only two state-listed 
species survival guidelines (out of a list containing thirty species).278 
Wisconsin’s incidental take permit program includes all the conditions 
present in federal law. It also includes a rare incidental take liability shield 
as part of its interagency coordination program similar to the ESA incidental 
take statement program, which has been an effective tool in mitigating 
agency impacts on listed species.279 Moreover, Wisconsin’s additional 
substantive criterion for state agency actions—that they not jeopardize the 
“whole plant-animal community” of which the listed species is a part—
shows how states can serve as laboratories for legal innovations that may 
prove more effective than the ESA, if monitored.280 Cooperative federalism 
could also promote monitoring through Service oversight of grants and 
delegation. 
If Congress wants states to assume a greater role in preventing 
extinctions, cooperative federalism offers a useful model.281 However, 
merely transferring the Services’ funding to states seems unlikely to achieve 
greater recovery success under most existing state laws. It might quell 
dissatisfaction with the federal program by blunting prohibitions and 
allowing more landowners to go about their business with less regulation. 
But, it would also undermine the goal of the ESA to improve the condition of 
species at the brink of extinction to a point where they no longer need 
intensive care. Everybody endorses collaborative conservation, but 
cooperative efforts depend on incentives for stakeholders to participate, 
often at the expense of more profitable opportunities. Short of direct 
payments to businesses and landowners as inducements, collaborative 
 
that its approach to natural resource decision making is the best way to achieve continual 
improvement and to adapt to climate change). 
 276  Robert L. Fischman & J.B. Ruhl, Judging Adaptive Management Practices of U.S. 
Agencies, 30 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 268, 271–72 (2016); Martin A. Nie & Courtney A. Schultz, 
Decision-Making Triggers in Adaptive Management, 26 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1137, 1141–42 
(2012). 
 277  Robert L. Fischman, The Divides of Environmental Law and the Problem of Harm in the 
Endangered Species Act, 83 IND. L.J. 661, 692 (2008). 
 278  OR. ADMIN. R. 635-100-0135 (2017) (guidelines for Coho salmon); id. 635-100-0136 
(Washington ground squirrel). 
 279  Compare WIS. STAT. § 29.604(6r)(d) (2017), with ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4) (2012). 
 280  WIS. STAT. § 29.604(6r)(a)(2). 
 281  Nagle, supra note 17, at 388–89 (arguing that cooperative federalism was the original 
understanding of how the ESA would be implemented to achieve recovery).  
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conservation requires that uncooperative parties face some risk or penalty. 
The ESA provides those negative inducements. Current state legislation 
mostly provides much less. 
Our results show that states are capable of enacting regulatory schemes 
that provide levels of imperiled species protection similar to the ESA. 
However, most do not. Perhaps cooperative federalism can encompass a 
grand bargain: more delegated authority and grants to states in exchange for 
stronger state programs. The pollution-control statutes are widely credited 
for enacting just such a deal. The Clean Air Act282 (CAA) and the CWA both 
enjoy active participation from state agencies, which often assume 
permitting responsibility as well as front-line enforcement and planning. One 
approach to spur greater responsibility for extinction protection would be to 
delegate otherwise federal functions, such as section 10 permitting, to states 
fulfilling minimum standards that advance the goals of the ESA. Both the 
CAA and CWA condition delegated permitting authority on state legal 
requirements that are at least as stringent as federal standards.283 In many 
cases, EPA retains state permit veto power.284 
FWS has experimented with delegating section 10 permitting in 
Florida,285 a state whose permitting standards, promulgated as an 
administrative rule, are at least as stringent as the corresponding federal 
standards.286 FWS requires that the Florida state permits be subject to 
enforcement by both the Service and the state, and that the state provide for 
administrative challenges to final permits.287 In that respect, the delegation 
parallels EPA authorization of state permits to substitute for federal permits 
under the CWA.288 Though no Florida legislation authorizes the state Fish 
and Wildlife Conservation Commission to ban incidental take,289 the Florida 
constitution provides the commission power to “exercise the regulatory and 
executive powers of the state” over fish and wildlife.290 The Commission 
exercised its power by promulgating a rule that bans harm, employing the 
 
 282  42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2012). 
 283  Id. § 7410; CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)–(c) (2012).  
 284  E.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d).  
 285  See generally FLORIDA COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT, supra note 103.  
 286  FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 68A-27.003 (2017) (prohibiting “take” of federally listed 
species); id. r. 68A-27.007(2)(b) (authorizing the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation 
Commission to issue permits for incidental take after taking into account several factors, 
including whether “the incidental take could reasonably be avoided, minimized or mitigated”). 
The Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission is developing species-specific 
permitting guidelines for its state-listed species. Species Conservation Measures and Permitting 
Guidelines, FLA. FISH & WILDLIFE CONSERVATION COMMISSION, https://perma.cc/SU4T-X859 (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2018). Such an effort goes beyond what the Services have been able to 
accomplish for federal endangered species. 
 287  FLORIDA COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT, supra note 103, at 4, 7. 
 288  33 U.S.C. § 1342(b). 
 289  FLA. STAT. § 379.101(38) (2017) (defining take as “taking, attempting to take, pursuing, 
hunting, molesting, capturing, or killing”). Nothing in the legislative definition of prohibited 
takes suggests a ban on harm, harass, or indirect/incidental injury. 
 290  FLA. CONST. art. 4, § 9. 
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same terms as the federal definition.291 The section 6 cooperative agreement 
allows the state incidental take permit to substitute for a federal one in 
providing a liability shield for the federal take prohibition.292 Tough 
regulations in Florida are built on weak statutory powers and are thus 
potentially more vulnerable to political shifts in administrative appointments 
to the commission. Nonetheless, the Florida experiment does show how 
existing ESA authority is flexible enough to employ some standard 
cooperative federalism tools. 
States cooperate with the federal government, in part, to better serve 
their citizens and businesses with local permitting. That is what motivated 
the Florida Fish and Wildlife Commission to enter into its cooperative 
agreement with the Service.293 The CWA lists eight prerequisites for states 
seeking to substitute their pollution discharge permitting for EPA’s program. 
The list includes many requirements that depend on state statutes giving the 
state implementing agency powers equivalent to those the CWA gives to 
EPA, such as permit termination, administrative inspection and monitoring 
powers, public participation procedures, and enforcement tools.294 However, 
unlike the major pollution-control permit programs, the ESA does not 
provide for states to assume permitting responsibilities. One way to induce 
greater cooperative federalism would be to amend the ESA to allow states to 
issue incidental take permits that would substitute for federal section 10 
permits if state legislation contains standards at least as strict as the ones in 
section 10. A handful of states already qualify based on their legislation. We 
recommend that the Services extend the Florida experiment to other states 
that have strong legislation. We agree with the Western Governors’ 
Association that the Services “[c]larify or emphasize” whatever existing 
authority they may have to authorize states to exercise concurrent 
jurisdiction for incidental take permitting.295 A particularly important 
clarification would be a Service description of the minimum legal authority 
that would qualify a state for taking on permitting jurisdiction. 
State assumption of permitting authority does more than relocate 
regulatory tools; it typically triggers federal grants to administer state 
programs. In line with the pollution-control model, the Western Governors’ 
Association has called for new federal monies to defray additional 
administrative costs to states undertaking recovery programs.296 More grants 
to states that take on greater responsibilities is a reasonable policy 
suggestion, but would need to be accompanied by a list of minimum 
administrative requirements that assure the public a voice in planning and 
permitting. The minimum standards for state programs should include the 
same kinds of assurances found in the CAA and CWA. Penalties for failure to 
meet minimum standards generally amount to loss of state control and 
 
 291  FLA. ADMIN. CODE r. 68A-27.001(4) (defining “take” to include “harm”). 
 292  FLORIDA COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT, supra note 103, at 6–7. 
 293  Id. at 1–2. 
 294  CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2012). 
 295  WGA RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 91, at 4. 
 296  WGA POLICY RESOLUTION, supra note 2, at 6.  
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federal grants. But the CAA goes further in allowing EPA to withhold 
transportation funding from uncooperative states.297 
Greater state government involvement in extinction prevention is 
important not just for ideological or political reasons stemming from a 
Jeffersonian view of the federal system. The single greatest cause of species 
decline into imperiled status is habitat modification or destruction.298 
Therefore, decisions about land use are paramount in achieving recovery. 
State laws directly, and indirectly through enabling legislation giving local 
jurisdictions power over land use, provide key legal tools for reducing 
extinction risks.299 There are opportunities for Congress and federal agencies 
to strike bargains giving states a greater say over imperiled species 
regulation in exchange for more effective habitat protection and 
improvement. Three of the four vanguard states, Illinois, Massachusetts, and 
Wisconsin, appear to have already met any realistic minimum criteria. 
The Western Governors’ Association has called for more flexible 
approaches to conservation through ESA section 4(d) rules.300 Yet, 4(d) rules 
are effective vehicles of cooperative federalism only with willing and 
capable state agencies. States are gun-shy about accepting certain offers of 
federal delegation where the regulation of private property will be 
unpopular. For instance, none of the Puget Sound planning jurisdictions 
carried out the program development needed to shield local land-use 
decisions from the prohibition against harm through the ESA 4(d) rule for 
Chinook salmon.301 While states have largely assumed responsibility for the 
CWA pollutant discharge elimination system permits, they have declined to 
adopt permits under the politically controversial section 404 program to 
regulate filling wetlands.302 State politicians do not wish to become targets 
 
 297  “Uncooperative federalism” is another way of describing state actions that impede 
federal statutory objectives. Most states act cooperatively in some areas of federal law where it 
suits their interests, and less so with other federal programs. In some circumstances, it can be 
politically advantageous for elected officials to challenge federal programs, despite lost 
opportunities or litigation costs. Robert L. Fischman & Jeremiah I. Williamson, The Story of 
Kleppe v. New Mexico: The Sagebrush Rebellion as Un-Cooperative Federalism, 83 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 123, 170–71 (2011). For a slightly different perspective on the meaning of the term, see 
Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 
1258–59 (2009) (providing additional examples of uncooperative federalism). 
 298  See Wilcove et al., supra note 74, at 608–09 (recognizing habitat degradation as a threat 
to 85% of imperiled species); see also NOSS ET AL., supra note 74, at 2, 5; NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL ET AL., supra note 74, at 35–38, 40. 
 299  Fischman & Hall-Rivera, supra note 17, at 133–36; Nagle, supra note 17, at 386–87. 
 300  WGA POLICY RESOLUTION, supra note 2, at 3; WGA RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 91, at 4. 
 301  See supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text; see also Eric S. Laschever, The 
Endangered Species Act and Its Role in Land Use Planning: Lessons Learned from the Pacific 
Northwest, 1 SEATTLE J. ENVTL. L. 103, 111–13 (2011) (documenting the failure of a multi-county 
initiative to qualify for the land-use management limitation under the 4(d) rule, despite local 
public support for salmon recovery). 
 302  See State or Tribal Assumption of the Section 404 Permit Program, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROTECTION AGENCY, https://perma.cc/3CDN-PUMN (last updated Dec. 21, 2017) (describing the 
permitting that states may assume under state laws but noting that only Michigan and New 
Jersey have assumed administration of the program); see also Adrienne M. Sakyi, Note, 
Mitigation Banking: Is State Assumption of Permitting Authority More Effective?, 34 WM. & 
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for opposition from constituents who oppose constraints on private 
property development. That only two states have ever assumed 
administration of the 404 program should dampen the enthusiasm of 
cooperative federalists who expect states to fill the shoes of the Services in 
imperiled species conservation, if given the chance.303 As with habitat 
modification, the filling of wetlands on private property presents 
circumstances where broadly shared benefits of regulation are shouldered 
by a concentrated class of landowners.304 Many proposals for more 
delegation to states are political strategies for winning elections, not 
necessarily offers to assume unpopular regulatory roles.305 
One paradox in the federalism debate over extinction prevention 
concerns the monitoring and listing of species on the brink of extinction. 
States often claim to have the best information on species because of their 
on-the-ground force of wildlife managers.306 There is a theory that would 
support the position that states can monitor species status at a lower cost 
than the central government.307 Federal listings generally occur only after 
species populations decline significantly below the threshold of 
endangerment.308 Yet, states often express surprise when ESA listings come 
along, and then ask for a grace period to develop conservation plans aimed 
at reversing the species slide.309 States asking for additional time to 
implement recovery programs after a federal ESA listing raise two key 
questions of state capacity.310 First, why did the state SWAP actions fail to 
prevent federal listing? Second, does state legislation support a credible 
program that can recover the species as effectively as the ESA program? Our 
results suggest that, rather than more time, states need better legal tools to 
address habitat-altering activities that imperil species. In addition to more 
money to arrest species declines through implementation of SWAPs, states 
need to bolster their more fearsome rules to channel private behavior 
toward species conservation. Further research to canvass state regulations 
 
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1027, 1036–39 (2010) (describing Michigan’s experience with the 
permit program). 
 303  State or Tribal Assumption of the Section 404 Permit Program, supra note 302. 
 304  WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR. & ELIZABETH BURLESON, RODGERS ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 4:12 
(2017), Westlaw (explaining how this political dynamic in the CWA 404 program creates 
litigation and anger). 
 305  Fischman & Williamson, supra note 297, at 173–74. 
 306  See, e.g., Press Release, House Comm. on Nat. Res., supra note 41 (statement of Rep. 
Doc Hastings, Chairman, Natural Resources Committee). 
 307  See Terry L. Anderson & Lawrence Reed Watson, An Economic Assessment of 
Environmental Federalism: The Optimal Locus of Endangered Species Authority, in THE 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND FEDERALISM, supra note 16, at 21, 30. 
 308  See Biber & Brosi, supra note 168, at 394–95; David S. Wilcove & Lawrence L. Master, 
How Many Endangered Species Are There in the United States?, 3 FRONTIERS ECOLOGY & ENVT. 
414, 414 (2005) (stating that only a fraction of imperiled species are listed under the ESA); see 
also David S. Wilcove et al., What Exactly Is an Endangered Species? An Analysis of the U.S. 
Endangered Species List: 1985–1991, 7 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 87, 90 (1993) (finding the median 
size of animal populations listed under the ESA was approximately 1000). 
 309  See WGA POLICY RESOLUTION, supra note 2, at 3. 
 310  Id. at 5.  
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and their effectiveness in practice is needed in order to better understand 
what states have been able to achieve. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The goal of the ESA is to conserve species to the point at which they no 
longer need the emergency-room programs provided by statute in order to 
avoid extinction.311 In 2016, an influential resolution of the Western 
Governors’ Association asserted that the ESA could be effective “only 
through a full partnership between the states, federal government, local 
governments and private landowners.”312 Most commentators and 
stakeholders across the political spectrum agree.313 However, much of the 
ESA-reform debate centers only on what the federal government should do 
to enter into full partnership. Largely neglected in this rhetorical oasis amid 
ESA contention is the role of state legislative reform to support more 
effective recovery. 
If state imperiled species laws performed better in arresting species 
declines, the Services would not be so overwhelmed by the flood of species 
eligible for listing and by implementing protective programs. If Congress and 
federal agencies performed better, states would spend less time on 
extinction prevention. States would also have greater resources and more 
opportunities for proactive conservation. The path forward requires all 
parties to step back from blaming each other and instead strengthen the 
ability of both state and federal actors to advance recovery goals. States that 
do not wish to promote imperiled species conservation through legislation 
could opt out of a cooperative federalism program. States that support 
conservation may borrow from sister state legislation containing useful 
models of interagency cooperation, prohibitions, and permits. 
The harsh reality of recovering hundreds of species on the brink of 
extinction due to habitat alteration that occurred over a span of decades, if 
not centuries, is that it is resource intensive. Ecosystems may take many 
years to mature into useful habitat and still rely on continued, active 
management to sustain habitat quality.314 Thus, recovery often requires 
expensive on-the-ground or in-the-water activities over the long term. The 
costs are often borne by a relatively small number of landowners. Property 
owners who forgo economically profitable land uses are justified in their 
complaints about footing the bill for reversing previous habitat harms often 
located elsewhere. However, the unavoidable burden of reversing long-term 
 
 311  See ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2012). 
 312  WGA POLICY RESOLUTION, supra note 2, at 6. 
 313  See Nagle, supra note 17, at 387 & n.13 (2017) (citing dueling testimony from Briefing on 
Improving the Endangered Species Act: Perspectives from the Fish and Wildlife Service and 
State Governors: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries, Water, and Wildlife of the H. 
Comm. on Env. & Pub. Works, 114th Cong. 6–7, 36 (2015)) (noting that both Dan Ashe, former 
Director of FWS, and Matt Mead, Governor of Wyoming, both agree about the need for state-
federal partnership despite expressing diametrically opposite views on whether the ESA can be 
characterized as a success or failure). 
 314  Dale D. Goble et al., Conservation-Reliant Species, 62 BIOSCIENCE 869, 869–70 (2012). 
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trends in habitat degradation is that it costs someone something to get the 
job done. Some “win-win” situations may arise.315 But generally, there are 
two means for prompting recovery efforts. One is to place the burden on 
habitat owners or users (where the habitat is unowned, as in the marine 
environment, or where the habitat is publicly owned but a user group has 
traditionally benefitted from its allocation, as in federal grazing lands). The 
other is public financing through taxes. The resistance of political leaders to 
do either characterizes the current stalemate over the ESA. 
If the ESA is to work as written or to be revised constructively, 
something has to give. Either governments will pony up more funding or the 
private sector will bear more costs. Feasible political compromise likely 
involves some mixing of both. But, merely transferring program 
responsibilities from austerely funded federal agencies to even more cash-
strapped state agencies will fail to advance the recovery goal of the ESA. 
Most existing state legislation to recover imperiled species is weaker than 
the ESA. There is no good reason to believe that state governments with 
smaller budgets and weaker laws will achieve greater conservation success 
than the federal program. Statutory reforms must be matched with money to 
carry out conservation actions. 
We found wide variation in state imperiled species legislation. The legal 
landscape, like the physical landscape, is diverse and no single approach to 
cooperative federalism will optimize recovery efforts across the country. 
Several states are already more than capable of taking on ESA permitting 
and other federal programs. We suggest that the Services and Congress 
begin with those states in order to develop a record of conservation 
successes. Our hope is that those pilot projects, married to financial 
incentives, will spur other states to improve their legal, regulatory, and 
management capabilities. Rather than respond to the loudest complainers, 
the federal government should first pick partners who have demonstrated 
their commitment to species recovery. 
 
 
 315  Thomas O. McShane et al., Hard Choices: Making Trade-Offs Between Biodiversity 
Conservation and Human Well-Being, 144 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 966, 967–68 (2011).  
